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CHAPTER I
THE PRELUDE
The course of Germany's diplomatic contact with Finland 
during the twentieth century has been shaped largely by- 
German war aims•in the eastern Baltic. In time of war,.Ger­
many. has had' to control the Baltic in order to protect the 
vital shipments of iron ore from Sweden and also to prevent 
any attack on its northern coast. Finland commands a highly 
strategic position in the northeast corner of the Baltic. A 
strictly neutral Finland presented no real threat to Germany 
during a war, but Finland, with its population of only three 
and a half million, could hardly hope to remain neutral of 
her own choice if it became the subject of either German or 
Russian military strategy.
If Germany chose to conquer Finland or direct Its for­
eign policy as an ally, it could gain many valuable strategic 
advantages. First of all, Finland could be used as a spring­
board for an attack on Russia's northern borders, Finland's 
pre-1939 eastern boundary, beginning at Petsamo in the north 
and extending south to the northeast corner of Lake Ladoga, 
shared almost a seven-hundred raiie common front with Russia. 
Control of the Petsamo area, could be used for an attack on 
the sea lanes leading to Murmansk, Russia's northern lifeline;
2
and the border running along Soviet Karelia offered innu-. 
merable points from which an attack could be- launched 
against the Murmansk-Leningrad Railroad, Finland’s pre-1939 
southern border with Russia crossed the narrow Karelian 
Isthmus which separates Lake Ladoga from the Gulf of Finland, 
At this point, Finland lay only twenty miles from Leningrad, 
placing Russia’s second largest city well within the range 
of modern artillery. The port of Hanko, located on the 
southwestern coast, was the Finnish harbor nearest to Germany 
and it could be used as a staging area or, a point from which . 
the Gulf of Finland could be closed to enemy shipping.: To 
the west, of Turku, Finland's ancient capital, lie the -Aaland 
Islands. There islands control the western approach to 
Stockholm and also dominate the sea lanes in the Gulf of 
Bothnia. Finland's geographical position easily lent itself 
to any German war plans for the domination of the Baltic or ■ 
the' establishment of a second front against Russia.
Unfortunately for Finland, Russia also recognized the 
strategic importance of its northern neighbor, and in the 
continuing course of the mutual animosity between Germany 
and Russia, nearly all of Finland’s diplomatic history in 
this century must be viewed as a struggle to avoid being 
turned into a Russo-German battlefield. No other nations or 
groups of nations came even-close to approximating the 
importance that Germany and Russia played in Finland’s inter­
nal and external policies. So important were Germany and
3
Russia to Finnish foreign affairs that Wipert von Bluecher, 
the German Ambassador to Finland from 1939 to 199-9, was led 
to observe that " ... all her ^Finland.'_s/ other diplomatic 
activities are carried on more or less as a sideshow*"i
Finland has long been caught between the eastern expan™ 
sion of the Western European nations and the western movement 
of Russia* First under Swedish control from the twelfth 
century and then as a Russian Grand Duchy under the tsars 
from 1809, Finland's position in the Baltic caused it to be 
used as a buffer zone of first one nation and then another, 
Germany began to exert its influence on the fate of 
Finland's political destiny from the beginning of World War I. 
Since the German involvement in Finland during the last year - 
of World War I closely parallelled the events that led to 
the Finno-German collaboration of 199-1, it is important to 
have a knowledge of the circumstances that surrounded Fin­
land's fight for independence and the German military 
intervention that kept the Bolshevik Revolution from absorbing 
the newly formed state*
During World War I, the German Eastern offensive sapped 
Russia's strength, and as Russia weakened her control over 
Finland weakened proportionately, Germany helped Finland
1U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign 
Policy, 1918-199-5, Series D (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1956-1969-), III, 553» Hereafter 
cited as DGFP.
vent some of its animosity against Russia in the early years 
of the war by accepting over two thousand Finnish volunteers, 
and training them as a unit to form the.27th Jaeger Battalion, 
which later served as the nucleus of Finland's officer corps 
during the War of Liberation.
The first Russian Revolution and the demise of the
Provisional Government in November of 1917 caused the Finns
to begin their first serious move for political sovereignty.
With the Bolsheviks in power, the conservative segment of ,
the Finnish Diet felt that it was time to terminate its '
relationship with Russia. While still afraid that the
monarchy might re-establish its rule, the Diet passed a
weakly-worded recognition of de_ facto Independence "f or :the .
time being” on November 15» 191?® Later,, on December •!, a
much stronger declaration of independence was read in the•
Senate. Now for that independence to become a reality, the
Russian troops which remained in Finland and the radical
Finnish socialists had to be purged from the political 
2scene.
The German Government now began to negotiate with Lenin 
for the recognition of Finnish independence. Already com­
mitted to a policy of recognizing the independence of national 
groups within the Empire, Lenin formally declared that he
2WJ » Hampden Jackson, Finland (New York: MacMillan Co.,
19^0), 85.
recognized Finland’s sovereignty on January 14, 1918.^
Finland’s War of Independence had now become a civil 
war. The Finnish radicals, augmented by the 37,000 Russian 
troops in Finland, were more than a match for the hastily- 
assembled forces of the conservative White Guard, The 
Finnish Red Guard quickly gained control of the industrial 
centers and' the entire southern half of the country. On 
January 28,. the Reds captured Helsinki, and the legitimate 
government was forced to flee westward to Turku, On the 
same day that the revolutionaries entered the capital, they 
proclaimed Finland to be a Socialist Workers’ Republic.^
One day prior to the Red- coup d'etat in Helsinki, the 
Senate had asked General Carl Gustav Mannerheim to become 
the Commander-In-Chief of the Finnish forces, Mannerheim 
was a member of one of the few noble families in Finland, 
and his. military credentials were impressive, The General 
had. spent thirty-seven years in the Russian Imperial Army 
and had served In the past two Russian wars. He was thor­
oughly acquainted with both the nobility and the top poli­
tical leaders of Europe, and his popular prestige in Finland 
seemed capable of calming much of the conservative
O Hampden Jackson, Finland (New York: MacMillan Co., 
1940), 8?.
^Carl Gustav Mannerheim, M e m o i r s trans, by Count Eric 
Lewenhaupt (New York: E.P. Dutton ,and Co,, 1954)., 134. 
Hereafter cited as Mannerheim.
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factionalism that existed in the country,, Mannerheim agreed
to lead the army on the one condition that the Senate would
not ask for either German or .Swedish intervention.^ Marshal
Mannerheim believed that the Finns, bolstered by the return
of the. highly disciplined 27th Jaeger Battalion from Germany,
would be, enough to defeat the larger but highly disorganized
Red Guard. What Mannerheim wanted to avoid at all cost-was
a close association with a foreign power which might lead"-'.'
Finland into a serious political compromise in the future.
It will never be known If the Finns-could have estab-,-
lished their own independence, for, unknown to Mannerheim,.
Senator Pehr Svlnhufvud had been negotiating for, German aid
7since December of 1917* The Germans were not quick to give, 
assistance to the Finns other than releasing the 27th Jaeger 
Battalion for service In the civil war. :The German sympathy 
was all for Finland, but it was willing to give aid only In 
.so far as it did not detract from their own war effort.
On February 17» the first of the Jaegers landed at
QVaasa with war material purchased in Russia by'the Germans,0 
On February 18, the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk 
broke down, freeing the Germans to aid the Finns and in .turn
■%an.ne r he im, 1^7 ■ 
6Ibid.s 135. 
7Ibid., 152.
8lbid.
?
help themselves by adding pressure on the Russians via a 
second front. The German Government was still uneasy about 
supplying aid to the Finns, but the-military convinced it 
that German intervention would place additional pressure on 
Russia and eventually lead to the elimination of any Allied 
attempt to land at M u r m a n s k ,  ̂ General Ludendorf stated that
the intervention would be purely in the best interests of’
o 10Germany«-v
Mannerheim, although bitterly disappointed, decided to
remain in command so that he could try to restrict the German
participation in the war. He demanded of and got a declara-.
tion from General Ludendorf stating that the German corps
in Finland would be under Mannerheim*s command and the
Germans would not try to interfere in Finnish domestic 
11affairs, Mannerheim also told the British that he would 
do everything he could to preserve Finnish neutrality, and
he firmly stated that the presence of German troops on Fin­
nish soil did not mean that Finland had entered the war’.'as. 
an ally of the Central Powers•
German troops began to arrive on April 3, when the
Baltic Division, under the command of Major-General Count .
%anne r he im, 159' 
1QIbia,, 156. 
U Ibid., 156-157.
12Ibid., 169.
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von der Goltz, landed at ilanko. J The number of the German 
troops which took -part in the campaign has been estimated to 
have been anywhere between 10,000 and 20,0005 whatever their 
exact number, their presence brought about a rapid destruc­
tion of the Red Guard. The rebel government fled from 
Helsinki the day the first German troops landed, and the 
Germans, assisted by the Finnish White Guard, were able to 
recapture the capital on the 18th. By May 16, the Red Giiard 
had been completely crushed and Marshal Mannerheim led a 
victory parade into Helsinki.
Immediately after the civil war, the Finns decided to 
choose a .German prince to reign as the constitutional monarch 
of their country. The Finns sought this tie with Germany 
because they were not yet confident that they would be able 
to retain their independence by themselves. There still 
remained the threat that Russia, once its own civil war 
ended, would again try to incorporate Finland Into the USSR. 
Although German soldiers remained in Finland, there is no 
indication that Germany attempted to pressure the Finns into 
making - this decision»
In May of 1918, the Finnish Diet, still convinced that 
Germany was not yet headed for defeat, elected the pro-German 
Senator Svinhufvud to act as Regent. He immediately began 
negotiations with Kaiser Wilhelm to see if he would put
■^Mannerhe irn, 173•
■forward ones of his sons to reign in Finland.. The Kaiser 
refused the crown for his sons, but he'' did suggest his 
.brother-in-law. Prince Frederick Karl of Hesse. On October 19 
the Diet elected Prince Frederick•king by a vote of 
seventy-five to twenty-five .• Prince Frederick, sensing- the 
imminent German defeat, refused the crown. When the armi­
stice was signed, Svinhufvud resigned, and Marshal Mannerheim, 
whom the Finns hoped would.be more acceptable to the Allies, 
was chosen uo rake his place.
Germany’s defeat in 1918 ended its extensive influence 
in Finnish affairs. A defeated-Germany could no longer 
offer to Finland the necessary guarantees against Russian 
aggression. Finland now had to try to steer a neutral course 
while it tried to gain protection by beginning to associate 
itself with Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries.
During the post-war years, German relations with 
Finland continued to be correct, but there were two foreign 
policy changes made by the Weimar Republic which caused 
Finland to grow cool toward Berlin. In 1922 when Germany 
signed-the Rappalo Treaty and again in 1926 when the first 
Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed, Finland began 
to feel that Germany was beginning to pave the way for a 
future settlement of the Polish problem. The Finns believed 
that a Busso-German understanding on Eastern Europe would ■
"1 uj/'Mannerheim, 18 0
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bring Finland into the Russian sphere ox" influence. In
order to escape from being included into the Soviet sphere,
Finland continued to draw closer to Great Britain and
Sweden, and, at the same time, maintain friendly relations
with both Germany and the Soviet Union. Worried by the
Busso-German Non-Aggression Pact, Finland did not seek
guarantees of protection from Germany; it instead began
negotiations In 192? for a non-aggression treaty with Moscow,
After nearly four years of interrupted.talks, the pact was
1 ̂signed in January, 1932* This, the B'inns believed, would 
bring the Soviets to believe that Finland was preparing only 
for the defense of Its borders and not searching for any 
alliances that would lead, to an offensive war.
The Finns also knew that friendly gestures toward the 
Soviet Union would not be enough to maintain their neutrality 
during a major war. They knew that Russia believed that 
Finland was not strong enough to prevent a German occupation, 
and they also realized that the Russians feared that the 
pro-German sentiment in Finland would help to facilitate any 
German .attempt to conquer the country. The fact that Finland 
had outlawed the communist party in 1930 and the growth of 
a Nazi-oriented Patriotic peoples* Party within Finland did 
not helo to quell the Soviets* doubts.
1 c■‘■-'Arnold J. Toynbee, ed„» Survey of International Affairs, 
1920~1923 (Oxford; Oxford University Press\' 1927J ,'2^1.
11
In 1921, Finland had considered entering into a. proposed 
Baltic bloc consisting of Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and 
Finland, Upon closer evaluation of this alignment, Finland 
felt that a treaty with Poland would further involve it in 
future.Russo-German disputes, In the mid-1930*s, Finland 
definitely decided that it would rather be thought of as a 
Scandinavian neutral rather than a part of any Baltic bloc, 
Sweden, the major Scandinavian power, was not particularly 
desirous of entering into any Nordic alliance with Finland,
It realized that an alliance with Finland, would perhaps lead 
to a future confrontation with Russia., and in 1936 Sweden ' 
sought to establish its complete neutrality by announcing ■ 
in the League of Nations that It did not wish to enter into 
any "regional commitments," The Swedes also announced that 
they would not become involved in any sanctions that the 
League should happen to apply to any aggressor nation. Under 
these circumstances, Finland found it Impossible to associate- 
itself with Sweden.^
During the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938s Sweden began 
to re-evaluate Its policy of complete neutrality. Alarmed 
by the growing German power, Sweden sought to bolster its 
defenses without unduly arousing Germany. In August, 1933, 
Finland and Sweden began talks on a joint guarantee and' 
refortification of the Aaland Islands, The islands were very
1 ̂°Manne rhe im, 286,
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important to both countries. For Sweden, they represented 
a means to protect its eastern coast and control the entrance 
to the Gulf.of Bothnia; for Finland, they now represented a 
chance to become associated with Sweden, Previously, in 
1921, Sweden and Finland had almost gone to war over the 
islands. The dispute was settled by the League of Nations 
through a special commission appointed to investigate the 
status of the islands. By the Aaland Convention of 1921, 
the League decided that Finland should retain possession of 
the islands, but they should be demilitarized and guaranteed 
by the signators of the convention. Now that the fortifica­
tion of the islands was mutually advantageous to both Finland 
and Sweden, they began their plans by seeking the approval 
of the change in the islands" status from the convention's
signators, Germany, as one of the guarantors, was expected
1 ?to offer the loudest objections to the refortification, (
The development of the Swedo-Finnish talks had caught
the Germans off guard. Previously, the German Foreign Office
had believed that the Aaland question was one of the major
factors which prevented any understanding between Finland 
1 8and Sweden, The Belch could not afford to take the refor­
tification plans lightly, because much of its iron ore from 
Sweden came through the Gulf of Bothnia. The Foreign Office
 ̂?Manne r he ini, 290, 
18DGP?s v, 555.
1.3
notified. Ambassador von Bluecher that he was not to reply to 
any questions on the German position on the proposed reforti­
fication; If any Inquiries were made, he was to say that he
IQhad no instructions on the matter. y As the German policy 
on the Aalands began to take shape, it appeared that the 
Reich would probably have no objections to the refortifica­
tion. Germany had no aggressive designs .on Sweden, and-It
felt that the joint occupation of the Islands would help to
2 0keep them out of Russia's hands. The Germans knew that • 
Finnish Foreign Minister Iiolsti was playing on Sweden’s, 
fear of Germany in order to bring about the agreement, but 
the Foreign Office felt that as long as Sweden's, neutrality 
was respected, the iron ore shipments would continue»̂  
Germany also felt that the Scandinavian countries hoped to 
maintain the status quo in the North. The Munich Agreement 
had generated much anti-German spirit in the North, but all 
of the Scandinavian countries continued to follow a course 
of strict neutrality.
On November 21, 1933, von Bluecher cabled a position 
paper to the Foreign Office. In this report he stated that, 
while the Finnish right wing’ and the officers' corps did not
19pGFP, V, 596-59?. 
20Ibid., 597-593. 
2iIhid,» 601,
22Ibid.f 604-607.
fear a German attack, the Social Democrats, who now con­
trolled a majority in the Diet, were aiming the Aaland;- / 
defenses at Germany, not .Russia, He also mentioned that- if .. 
the northern Aaland Islands which commanded the Kvarken 
Straits were fortified Germany's iron ore shipments would 
be’seriously endangered. With this warning in mind, the 
problem was referred to the German High, Command (OKH)«'. It 
decided In January, 1939? that the fortifications should not 
be objected to even if they were directed at Germany, It 
was more important for the Reich to know that they could.also 
be used as a defense against Russian designs in the a r e a .
OKH believed that the demilitarization should be limited to 
the southern islands and that German approval’ should be made 
contingent upon the receipt of a Swedish guarantee that Iron 
ore shipments would continue in case Germany became involved 
in a war and an additional guarantee that Sweden would pro­
tect these shipments in their transit through the Gulf of 
oh.Bothnia, ' Although the German Government had now given its 
tacit approval to the plan, minor reservations were still 
held on the number of Swedish troops to be stationed on the 
islands. No objection would be made to Sweden's participa­
tion In the construction of the defenses and an almost carte 
blanche approval would be given to the Finnish involvement.
23.DGFP, v, 610-613.
24Ibid.8s 613,
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but the High Command still wanted to make sure that Sweden 
would .in no way endanger Germany's best interests in the 
area.
The German Government had warmed to the Aaland fortifi-. 
cation, but the Russians were adamant in their objections...
To the Soviet Union, the defenses would not be considered .as ' 
a determent to Nazi aggression; they would be looked upon as. 
a Germa/n way station on the road to an attack on Russia. The 
USSR had communicated a message to the Finnish Foreign Office 
which claimed that Germany and Finland had negotiated a 
secret agreement that would place the Aaland fortifications ' 
at Germany's disposal in case of war. The whole Aaland'
question, which had begun as an attempt by Finland to asso­
ciate itself with Sweden and Scandinavian neutrality, had 
now turned into a shuffling for position in the Baltic by 
Germany and Russia.
Throughout February of 1939? the German Foreign Office 
continued to withhold its final approval of the fortification. 
In March, Lithuania ceded Kernel to Germany, and Great Britain 
announced its guarantee of Poland. As the situation in 
Europe grew more tense, Finland became even more anxious to 
begin the fortifications. On April 2, the Foreign Secretary 
of the German Foreign Office, Baron Ernst von Weizsaecker,
25dopp9 v s 625-626. 
26dgfp, VI, 229-230.
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announced that Germany would not object to the fortifica­
tions, but it did object to Sweden being the only member of 
the Aaland Convention to participate in the islands’ defense, 
'weizsaecker did hint that this objection would be dropped 
if Sweden would issue a positive statement that would assure
Germany of a continuation of iron ore shipments at a pre-war
27level in case a major war did begin, r
To further secure Germany’s position in the Baltic*
Weizsaecker instructed the Reich’s ambassadors in Helsinki*
Stockholm* Oslo* and Copenhagen to broach the question of
future non-aggression pacts. On May 9? the delegates of
the Scandinavian countries met at Oslo and decided that they
29wanted to continue a policy of strict non-alignment,
Denmark eventually negotiated a non-aggression pact with 
Germany, but for the moment the Nordic nations stood as one 
on this matter. In a separate note to Germany, Finland made ■ 
it known that it would not be able to enter into a 
non-aggression agreement. The refusal to negotiate an agree­
ment caused Weizsaecker to view Finland’s foreign policy 
with scorn. Finland had refused the proposed pact by saying 
that it did not want to become a "pawn" in any political
2?DGFP, VI, 28^-286,
28Ibid,, 359.
2^Vaino Tanner, The Winter War-(Stanford, California: 
■Stanford University Press, 195?!! l6« Hereafter cited as 
Tanner.
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combinations concerning the great powers. Weizsaecker was 
■bemused with this stand because Finland continued to retain 
its non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. He felt that 
Finland would soon have to make the choice of a political 
alliance with either Germany or the USSR, and he knew that 
an association with Russia was unthinkable for Finland.;
On May 2, the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, cabled his approval of the joint fortification 
to von Bluecher, but he added that he expected Sweden to 
continue to pursue a course of strict.neutrality toward 
Germany. The German approval of the Swedish participation 
stemmed in.part from the recent Franco-British attempt to 
begin an encirclement of Germany in order to guarantee 
Poland. Even if relations between German;/ and Sweden were 
strained, the sanction would help to ease the situation in 
the Baltic. For Germany, 'the optimum settlement of the ques­
tion would have been a unilateral defense of the islands by
Finland, but the Finns* desire to become associated with
30Sweden prevented this solution.
The Russians had protested against the refortification, 
and they raised the volume of that protest once they had 
heard of the German approval. In May the Aaland question was 
brought before the League of Nations, and Russia hoped to 
intervene there. Although Finland and Sweden had gained the
3°DG-F'Pt VI, 402
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consent of all of the signators of the 'convention, Russia 
stated that its approval or denial should be considered, as 
the fortifications directly affected its national security. 
On May 27, Alexander Maisky, Russia's Ambassador to London, 
told.the League that the fortifications could be used to 
"bottle up" Russia in the Gulf of-Finland, The Ambassador 
also pointed out that there was no guarantee in the
1
Swedo-Finnish plan which would prevent these fortifications
from being used by a hostile third power-against the Soviet
Union,^1 Of course, no paper guarantee would ever satisfy
the Soviet Union. On May 31» Molotov said that the USSR
desired either a continuation of the status quo or an invi-
32tation to join in the defense of the islands. This was 
entirely too much for Sweden, It nox\r found itself like 
Finland, caught between the conflicting aims of Germany and 
the Soviet Union. In order to avoid this seeraingly insol- 
vable dilemma, Sweden told Finland that, it was no longer 
interested in the project,
MO sooner had the Aaland question passed momentarily- 
from the scene than the Baltic came Into the general problem 
of peace in Europe once again, this time in respect to the 
Pranco-Brltish attempt to gain a mutual assistance treaty
31 Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 
1933-19^1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), III, 
33T--333'V"" Hereafter cited as SDFP.
^Mannerheim, 301*
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with Russia in order to curb Germany's desire to move into 
Poland. Both Great Britain and France had been thoroughly 
alarmed when Hitler began to intimate that he. wanted to seek 
a solution to the polish problem by annexing Danzig and 
building a road across the Polish Corridor, By past expe­
riences they knew that once Germany had gained these conces­
sions it would not be long before it tried to eliminate the 
corridor and perhaps all of Poland as well. Britain had at 
first tried to show Hitler its intentions by guaranteeing 
Poland's neutrality on March 31• it now.sought to strengthen 
that guarantee by bringing Russia into -a.mutual assistance- 
pact, , .
Russia entered the talks with Great Britain and France
with caution and a well-developed concept of what it wanted
to gain through the negotiations. Russia knew that if Bri-
tain's plan to encircle Germany were to become a concrete,.
political reality it' had to have Russian support. The Soviet
Union did not intend to sell this support cheap.- It-.wanted
three things in exchange for its cooperation: (1) 'a Franco-
British guarantee in case of a German attack on Russia,
(2) permission to assist Poland in case of a German attack
on that country, and (3) the right to be considered the pro-
33tector of Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia,
David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 
1939-19-22 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
19^2)7"v0» Hereafter cited as Dallin.
The first problem which arose in the talks was the 
Soviet concern with the Franco-British guarantee of mutual, 
assistance to Russia. The British and French had proposed 
that Russia should come to their aid in the event of a war 
arising from a Nazi attack on Poland or Rumania,, It, 
however, was not stated in the text of the proposed treaty 
that Great Britain and France would come to the assistance 
of Russia in case of a German attack on the Soviet Union.
The British contended that this need not be spelled out ;in 
the treaty because a German attack on Russia, would have to 
be preceded by an attack on Poland, which then would auto­
matically bring complete military assistance to the Soviet 
Union. Russia pointed out that it not only felt threatened 
by Germany on its western borders, but on its northern bor­
ders as well. The USSR would not feel secure until the Baltic 
was also guaranteed.-^ The whole problem of the Russian 
guarantee of Poland was further complicated when the poles 
informed the British that they had no desire to have the 
Soviet Union participate in their defense.
Perhaps the problem that Poland presented could have 
been cleared up, but the Russians chose to use the British 
and French desire to gain a guarantee of Poland as a lever to
' h i p -
■>'F . L. Woodward and Rohan Butler- (eds,), Documents on 
British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939; Third Series (London:’
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953)? VI, 50-51* Hereafter 
cited as British Documents.
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keep the question of a Russian guarantee of the Baltic open,
Russia seemingly would not come to terms on Poland until
Britain and Prance came to terms on the Baltic.-'-'
The initial Soviet demands of Pranco-British assistance
in the .Baltic was a frank and realistic expression of the
Russian fear of Nazi aggression from the north. Pravda
stated the Russian position on the Baltic when it said that
even if the Baltic nations continued to be neutral this would
not prevent Germany from launching an attack against them.
Once the war was on, these tiny nations could not hope to
hold their own.^
The Russians then brought forth the proposal that they
should guarantee the Baltic in case of either direct or
37indirect aggression by Germany, • The question of "indirect 
aggression" was the point on which the talks with Britain and 
France ultimately e n d e d ,̂ 8 term "indirect aggression”
was at best a nebulous expression which pointed to a Soviet, 
take over in the eastern Baltic area. The USSR never did 
specifically define what they meant by the terra, for its 
vagueness would allow the Russians to interpret it as they 
pleased once the British and the French agreed to its
-^Dallin, 32,
5DFF, III, 335. 
-^Dallin, kl-kZ.
3sur'Did,, 29
inclusion in the treaty. The Russians probably would have 
interpreted "indirect aggression" as the development of any 
Nazi fifth-column movement in the Baltic States or even any 
heightening of tensions in Europe which the Soviets believed 
to indicate an impending war. If Russia, were-allowed to 
construe the term’s 'meaning, even the slightest threat would
■ be"' considered as a casus foederis.
The' British and the' French were now In a difficult, if 
not an ironical, position. The Russians would not cooperate
■ in respect to the Polish guarantee without its own guarantee 
of the Baltic nations. Since the Baltic nations had informed 
Britain that they did not want to be protected by the Soviet 
Unionj the Inclusion of the indirect aggression clause in the 
treaty, despite the objections of these smaller nations, 
would simply be condoning one form of aggression in order to 
prevent another.
The British did make a suggestion, which they hoped would 
satisfy the Russian demand for security and still prevent it 
from moving its forces Into the Baltic States whenever it 
wished to. The proposal was to Insert a clause in the treaty 
which would call for "immediate consultations” in the event 
of a threat of "indirect aggression" by Germany. This would 
perhaps calm the fears of the Baltic nations that-Russia 
would act unilaterally in their defense. Russia refused to 
negotiate on the basis of the new proposal, because it 
believed that Britain and France were too far from the Baltic
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to offer any immediate assistance and -consultations on a
course of action -would be a disadvantage to Russia if an
39immediate action wers called for. '
The rest of the talks degenerated into a dispute over 
the semantics of the indirect aggression guarantee. The 
British went to almost every possible extreme, short of the 
appeasement that Russia desired, in order to-bring about the 
mutual assistance pact. Perhaps the height of British 
ingenuity and desperation was contained in Ambassador William 
Seeds* proposal of June 16. In this proposal to the 
Russians he saids
If through the action of a European 
Power, there arises a threat to the Inde­
pendence or neutrality of another European 
State, whether bordering on one of the 
contracting countries or not, which one of 
the contracting countries considers to con­
stitute a menace to Its own security or to 
the peace of Europe, the three Governments, 
without prejudice to the action which one or 
the other of them may take In the interest 
of its own security or in the execution of 
an' obligation of assistance win, at the 
request of any one of them, immediately con­
sult together to examine the situation -with 
a view to deciding by common consent, should 
the necessity arise, upon the application of 
the mechanism of mutual assistance in con­
formity with the principles of but Independ­
ently of, the procedure of -the League of 
Nations.
Language or good will could hardly be stretched any further,
39sdpp, III, 352-35 .̂
ji A British Documents, VI, 98.
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but still the Soviet Union refused the suggestion.
Hitler was worried about the talks at the Kremlin. He' 
felt that a successful completion of the negotiations would 
stop the momentum of his foreign policy, and once the origi­
nal impetus was lost there was a strong possibility that, 
not only would his aggressive designs on Poland be checked, 
but he would be forced to begin to make a gradual withdrawal 
from the gains he had made thus far. For Hitler the con­
tinuation of his strategy was directed at Poland, and it 
seemed that a victory there was contingent upon the outcome 
of the British attempt to encircle Germany-, Both Britain 
and France had warned Hitler that there would not be another 
Munich over Poland; the Western Allies were prepared to make 
a stand and they let the Fuehrer know this in the strongest 
possible terras.
Germany now began to feel isolated. Japan had recently, 
refused to sign a military alliance with the Reich, and 
Weizs&ecker had told Neville Henderson, the British Ambas­
sador to Berlin, that he was " . • • alarmed, at .Britain's
efforts to encircle Germany by the attempt to conclude a-
4ltreaty at almost any jprice with Russia," Hitler was now 
forced to lessen the tension in Danzig and the Polish 
Corridor while he waited for a chance to strengthen his own 
position.
^British Documents, VI, 59 •
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On Hay 21, Hitler signed the Mutual Assistance Treaty 
with Italy, and on the very next day he Informed his High 
Command that "There Is no question of sparing Poland and we
cxa.re left with the decision: To attack Poland at the first
hpsuitable opportunity." On June ?, Hitler tried to throw 
a,stumbling block In the way of the Allied negotiations with 
■the Soviet Union by signing non-aggression pacts with Latvia 
'and Estonia. Finland was also offered a similar agreement 
but.It refused, saying that it felt no need for any pact when 
relations, between the two countries were already peaceful.
In reality, Finland was still trying to placate Russian 
doubts by avoiding any type of treaty with Germany.
When Hitler saw that the Allied negotiations with the 
USSR were breaking down, he tried to establish a detente 
with Russia,, In late May, Weizsaecker had informed the 
German Minister to Moscow, Count von Sohulenburg, that eco­
nomic talks with the Soviet Union would be r e s u m e d . ^  
Previously, it had been felt that Russia, would only use talks 
with Germany to pressure the French and the British into an 
agreement on the Baltic. Weizsaecker had said that the 
Anglo-Russian. pact 'would be hard to prevent, and a failure
h-2' Allan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1962),. 509.
^Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (eds,), 
Nazi-Soviet Relations (New York: Didier, 1948), 15-1?. 
Hereafter cited as Nazi-Soviet Relations.
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of Nazi-Soviet talks would only produce "a peal of Tartar
hj;laughter," ’v
Dr. Karl Schnurre, the Director of the German Foreign 
Office's European and Baltic sections of. the Commercial 
Policy Division, was sent to Moscow to reactivate trade 
negotiations, while .Ambassador Schulenburg began to put out 
feelers for a possible non-aggression pact. The talks with 
Russia went rapidly through July, and a frenzy of. diplomatic 
activity took place in August as Hitler's projected date for 
the invasion of Poland neared.
On July 27» Schnurre reported, "Our assumption that the 
Baltic countries and Finland are in our sphere of influ­
ence ... completed for the Soviet Union the feeling of being
l i emenaced,'’ J S’chnurre continued his report by saying that he 
had assured the Russians that the German Government was no 
longer looking in the direction of the Baltic and that the 
recently-concluded non-aggression pacts with Latvia and 
Estonia should lend credence to that fact,^° Exactly one day 
before Schnurre filed this report, von Bluecher had assured 
Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the rumor that Germany 
was going to give the Baltic States to Russia was "propoganda
kipNazi-Soviet Relations, 9, 
^Ibid., 33.
2?
Li17fairy-tales,"'1 and two days later Finland was told that this 
story was "being circulated by the British to disrupt the' 
Nazi-Soviet talks.
On August *4-, Schulenburg gave Russia its final assurance 
that there would be no clash of interests in the Baltic,^ 
and on the 5th Hitler told his Foreign Office to make every 
attempt to close the a g r e e m e n t . O n c e  the issue of the 
Baltic was settled, the partition of Poland was agreed, upon, 
and on-August 23, the Non-Aggression Pact was signed and: ’ • • 
placed into effect before it was even formally, ratified 'by; 
either side.
Besides the formal text of the Non-Aggression Pact, 
which' was communicated to the rest of- the world, the treaty - 
also contained a secret protocol. Article;1 of this secret 
protocol placed Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia 
within the Soviet sphere of influence, Germany had abandoned 
Finland and the rest of the eastern Baltic in order to pro­
ceed with its plans for Poland. Finland had looked upon 
Germany as a possible ally in a time of crisis, and now 
Germany had created a crisis for Finland. When the Soviet 
Union began to implement the provisions of the secret
^DGFP, VI, 1002. 
^Ibid., 1003-100**.
"^Nazi-Soviet Relations, 39■
5°Dallln, 38
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protocol, Germany looked the other way. Finland was' now 
summarily abandoned by Germany, and it would have to face 
the threat of Russian expansion unassisted by a single 
tective alliance.
The German attitude toward Finland from the signing of 
the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union until the end 
of the first Russo-Finnish war can best be described as 
negative* There was pro-Finnish sentiment in Germany just 
as there were pro-German feelings in Finland, but the Secret 
Protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact had placed Finland and the 
Baltic Nations within the Soviet sphere of influence, Ger­
many knew that the pact had freed the Soviet Union to carry 
out its designs in t’pis area, but the Reich condoned the 
Soviet aggression because it felt that it was politically 
and militarily expendable for the moment. These countries 
were to be looked upon as pieces of real estate to be bartered 
or exchanged for other territories considered to be of 
greater value to the expansion of the Reich,
In August of'1939» Hitler had focused his attention on 
Poland.. It was to the East that Lebensraum was to be found, 
and Poland, was to be the next target for Hitler’s Master 
Strategy. The Fuehrer hoped to partition Poland a la Munich
-TiThe Soviet Union thought of Finland as being part of 
the Baltic Bloc, while Finland thought of itself as being a 
Scandinavian country.
but he did not discount a military take-over* As long as 
the Soviet Union remained uncommitted to rany- of the power 
blocs then forming, Hitler knew that the Allies would attempt, 
to reach an accord with Russia and complete their plan of 
encircling Germany. The Soviet Union's price for its 
cooperation in the Allied plan to curtail Hitler's advance 
had been freedom of action in the eastern Baltic, a price 
that the Allies had been unwilling to pay. Hitler, however, 
was wining to meet the Soviet demands, and by meeting them 
he gained his own freedom of initiative to continue against 
Poland.
The decision to abandon Finland to the USSR did present 
two major tactical .problems to Germany. A Soviet occupation 
of•Finland would cut off valuable Finnish trade and give the 
Soviets control of the eastern shores of the Baltic and the 
Gulf of Bothnia. The control of the Gulf of Bothnia In turn: 
would possibly lead to Russian influence in northern Sweden 
and this would represent a possible threat■to. the all-important 
shipments of Swedish iron ore from this .area. These disad­
vantages , however, lay in the future. Hitler was willing to 
risk them because he believed that it was imperative to con­
tinue the momentum of his present policy in the- East. This 
momentum seemingly could only be prolonged by an immediate 
solution to the Polish question.
It did not take the Soviet Union long to take advantage 
of .the- new freedom of action it had gained in the Baltic and
px
Poland, On September 1?, only two and. one half weeks after
the Nazis launched their offensive against Poland, the Soviet
Union broke off diplomatic relations with Warsaw'-” ana began
to occupy the territory which had been reserved for it by
3Article 2 of the Non-Aggression pact's Secret Protocol,
On September 28, A Mutual Assistance Treaty was signed with 
h,Estonia, and an Identical agreement was negotiated with 
Latvia on October 5*^ The treaties were really not negotiated; 
they were forced upon the countries. The Soviet Union hoped 
to. complete.the expansion of its buffer zone against Germany 
while the Reich was still occupied with the Allies, Since 
the Non-Aggression Pact prohibited the. use of Germany as the 
country against which the treaties were to be directed, the 
Soviet Union said that It was trying to protect these nations 
from the threat of British aggression, Lithuania x-jas treated 
with a little more diplomatic respect since it shared no 
common borders with the USSR and because Germany had terri­
torial interests in Meraeland,° A treaty, which called for
2SDFP, hi, 374-376.
"'ibid,, 359-361.
^Dallin, 83-85•
^Albert M. Tarulis, Soviet policy Toward the Baltic 
States, 1918-1990 (Notre Dame", Indiana.* University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1959)™!. 155»
^Germany had earlier acquired the port of Memel, which 
lay adjacent to East Prussia,
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“mutual consultations” in the event of direct or implied
naggression against Lithuania, was signed on October 10.'
The wording of these three treaties may have been slightly
different, but the intent of each was quite similar. By
June of 1940, all three countries' had been absorbed by the
Soviet Union in order to ’’protect" them from the Allies.
Soviet- plans to gain security along its northern borders
began long before the autumn of 1939* As early as April 19,
1938, Boris Jartsev, the Second. Secretary to the Soviet •
'Legation in HeIsinki, began secret talks with Foreign Minister
8Rudolph Holsti, jartsev informed Holsti that, while the 
Soviet Union respected Finland’s territorial sovereignty,
It was convinced that Germany was planning an attack on 
Russia through Finland. If this happened, the USSR would be 
forced to advance and meet the attack on Finnish soil. If 
Finland would guarantee to resist any German attack, the 
Soviet Union would aid it with both men and material, There 
were other proposals of a very vague nature, but the main 
tenor of the talks was that Finland should, act in concert
i
with the USSR in the defense of Russia’s northern borders, 
Finland, which had no interest in the proposal, could not
?Sowle1 Documents, III, 380-382.
OThe talks were so secret that only a few Finns knew that 
they were being conducted. Not even President Kallio was 
informed about them. The Russian secrecy was so strict that 
the Russian Ambassador to Helsinki and Litvinov, the Soviet 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, remained ignorant of them.
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afford to dismiss the suggestion immediately. The'talks 
continued in secrecy at infrequent intervals for the rest
Qof the year, but no decisions were reached on the matter.x
In August of 1939> when tensions in Europe were being 
heightened by talk of a Nazi offensive against Poland, the 
Soviet Union felt that it was necessary to increase its 
pressure on Finland in order to come to an agreement on the 
northern borders. Jartsev announced that his government 
ranted; (1) a written guarantee that Finland would attempt 
to repel any German invasion and accept Soviet aid in its 
effort to do so, (2) a thirty-year lease on the island of 
Hogland in the■Gulf of Finland, and (3) a bilateral fortifi-
< A
cation of the Aaland Islands«xu
All of these Soviet requests were clearly an attempt to 
protect Russia from a possible German attack. The Aaland 
Islands were important to. Russia In that, by sharing In their 
defense., the Soviet Union would be in a position to sever the 
main line of sea communications between Finland and Germany, 
and, at the same time, enable the. Russians to block the 
entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia .and thereby keep Swedish iron 
ore from reaching Germany, The naval station at Hogland. 
would allow the Soviet Baltic Fleet to seal off the entry to
% a x  Jacobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War ('Cam­
bridge; Harvard University Press, 19 6T), 7-12.
i nMannerheim, 29 .̂
O it
the Gulf of Finland and protect Leningrad and the naval . 
bas e at Krons tadt•
Finland’s .adamant stand against the proposals ms. 
severely complicated by the new Nazi-Soviet accord. The 
Finnish Foreign Office had always hoped that the natural ani­
mosity between Germany and the Soviet Union would act as a
counterbalance to prevent an attack on Finland by either of
, - , 11 r n e r wo p owe r s .
Instead of softening their demands in order to reach a
compromise with Finland, the Soviets* terms became harsher
as the talks continued, Now, instead of asking for the lease
of territory which lay on the outer periphery of Finland, ;■
Molotov, who, with Stalin, had replaced Maxim Litvinov as f
the director of Soviet foreign policy, demanded that the
Finns give Russia a thirty-year lease on the port of Hanko'
r~\
and rectify the border along the Karelian' Isthmus. ^ Hanko 
was the major Finnish port on the Baltic, and the Soviets 
believed that it was there that the Germans would try to make 
an entrance into Finland, In 1939s the Karelian border was 
only twenty miles from Leningrad. Molotov wanted to move it 
farther north to take the city out of artillery range and
11MannsrheIm, 295•
12“Manneme Im, 311.
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•1 Qalso to destroy the effectiveness of the Mannerheim Line.
When the Finns noticed the calm assurance of the Soviets' 
at the conference table, they quickly began to suspect' that 
the USSR and Germany had come to an agreement■on the disposal 
•of-Finland. The Finnish Foreign Office immediately began to. 
ask' Berlin if there were more to the Non-Aggression Fact than 
what had already been published,
Three days after the signing of the Pact, Foreign 
Minister Erkko asked the German Ambassador if any agreement 
concerning Finland had been made with the Soviet Union.
Von Bluecher informed Erkko that the Pact contained no secret 
protocol, and the Non-Aggression Treaty was beneficial to 
Finland in that it removed the .Baltic from the war. Arne 
Wuorimaa, Finland * s Ambassador to Germany, was given a simi­
lar explanation in Berlin.^ To prevent any diplomatic 
indiscretions by his staff, Eibbentrop cabled the legations
in Finland, Latvia, and Estonia to tell them not to mention
3 6anything about any new spheres of influence.'
•^The Mannerheim Line was Finland's major line of defense 
against the Soviet Union. It was not composed of man-made 
fortifications comparable to the Maginot or Seigfreia Lines, 
and its main defensive advantages lay in the.swamps and 
'marshes of the area, which made a mechanized assault against 
the area all but impossible.
TTTT OOPJ, Jf V X Xf e
a 15ibia„, 543-5^5.
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Germany's position was clear: it had non-aggression
pacts with the Baltic Nations, and it had declared its
intent to respect the neutrality of the Scandinavian coun­
tries, but the Reich was still willing-to allow Russia to 
proceed unobstructed in its plans for the North,
Not all members of the German Foreign Office viewed
this new diplomatic tack with calm assurance. Ambassador 
Bluecher"*"̂  tried desperately to keep Germany from ignoring 
Finland's fate.-1̂  In September, as Finland sought to miti­
gate the Soviet demands and gain approval of its plans for a 
bilateral fortification of the Aaland Islands with Sweden, 
Blue cher asked his Foreign Office to intercede oh '..Finland-4'? 
behalf in its talks with the Soviet U n i o n T h i s  was the 
first, but not the last time he -would try to involve Germany 
in the talks, Weizsaecker, the Foreign Office's Foreign 
Secretary, replied to Bluecher's request .x̂ 'ith a firm no#
This suggested course of action -would only involve Germany in 
unnecessary disputes with the Soviet Union and make it appear
as if the Reich was not respecting the spirit of the Secret 
20Protocol, At the end of September, Bluecher attenuated to
1 7“"'Wipert von Bluecher's diplomatic career extended well back into the days of the Weimar Republic. He was not overly 
sympathetic with the Nazis, and, since his assignment to
p.11 Vi "1 Z'i V) H cr£> l  •vo'o.rl o r lo o r \  *r*o r* *t“ -P r\ *r» V-.'io V>/^o*r vxcx-f-v rsm
fj s ^  a  A s y  < ‘i ..t* w  *v J. w  A j, v iw~4 J X — ^ x  j, x  w v  u /  s*' X X V* W  Vf*
Finland, he had gained a deep respect for his host nation
i Q•‘■ Jacobson, 25.
^DGPP, VIII, 106-10?.
20Ibid., 10?,
assess Finland's new position as a result of the Nazi-Soviet 
accord. He stated that Finland’s econoray had been drasti­
cally altered now that the war had all but cut it off from 
Great Britain. He also felt that Germany's reserved atti­
tude toward Finland had caused a serious deterioration in the 
ties between the two nations. The Finns believed that 
Germany's decision to make friends with the Soviet Union had 
been the primary cause ox its current dilemma with Russia. 
Bluecher wont on in order to revive German interest in Fin­
land by sayings "He should utilize «„e the economic poten­
tials of the country and develop our position so that it will 
be maintained even after the war.”"' In view of the fact 
that this assessment and suggestion was made just one day 
prior to the signing of the German-Soviet Boundary and 
Friendship Treaty, It did little to cause the German Foreign 
Office to develop a sympathetic attitude toward Finland.
The Finnish Foreign Office also continued in Its efforts 
to establish a dentente with Germany. Ambassador Wuorlmma“ 
told Weizsaecker that the Soviet Union was beginning to 
change the entire .balance of power in the Baltic. He hinted 
that Russia was rapidly trying to gain strategic positions 
in Finland which could only be directed against Germany. 
Wuorimaa reminded Weizsaecker that Finland had declared its 
neutrality in the war and had begun to try to eliminate
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pro-British sentiment in the country; in return for these
gestures of good will, he felt that Germany should ask the
Soviet Union to lessen its demands on Finland. Weizsaecker
answered by chiding the ambassador over the fact that Finland
■ had refused Germany's previous offer of a friendship treaty
and said' that the Beich was in no position to intervene :in
22the Russo-Finnlsh conversations.
The negotiations were resumed on October 12, in Moscow* 
Two days before they began, Blueeher again tried to portray 
the seriousness of the situation to the Foreign Office in 
Berlin. The Finns had begun a partial mobilization of their 
army in order to ready themselves for the Soviet threats that 
they knew would accompany the Russian demands at the con­
ference table. Blueeher reported that anti-German sentiment 
was on the rise in Finland and. that there had been incidents 
against the local Kelchsdeutsehe and Volksdeutsche * He 
thought that the Soviet's incursion into Finland would cause 
"grave consequences" and hoped that Germany could offer some 
aid without altering its Baltic policy.^ Ribbentrop realized 
that even the slightest German assistance to Finland would 
violate the spirit of the Non-Aggression Pact and seriously 
complicate the continuance of friendly Russo-German rela­
tions . The German Foreign Minister sternly ordered Blueeher
^^Nazi-Soviet Relations, 121-122. 
23Ibid», 1231 and DGPP,' VIII, 251.
to follow the prescribed policy of neutrality and avoid any 
personal speculation on the future course of events in 
Finland. Furthermore, Blueeher was ordered to discourage 
ex-President Svinhufvud from making a trip to Berlin to ask 
for assistance. Svinhufvud*s pro-German sentiments were well 
known and the Reich wished to avoid any embarassment that 
his presence in Berlin would cause while the critical talks 
were progressing in Moscow. Ribbentrop ended his communique 
with the phrase that had become his guideline to the situa­
tion; " .,, Germany is not concerned with Russo-Finnish 
24problems’,"
When the Russo-Finnish talks were resumed in Moscow on 
October 12, Juho Paasikivi, the Finnish Ambassador to Sweden, 
headed Finland's negotiations’ team. He was also accompanied 
by Vaino Tanner, then the Finnish Minister of Economics,, and 
Colonel paasonen from Marshal Mannerheim*s staff, Molotov 
and Stalin directed the Soviet diplomacy. The fact that 
these two Soviet leaders maintained, exclusive control of the 
Russian negotiations indicates the extreme seriousness .of 
the talks. Molotov informed the ’Finns that two questions 
had to be settled at the conferences, The Soviet Union had 
to secure the safety of Leningrad and be completely satisfied 
that Finland would maintain firm, friendly relations with 
the USSR, If these two points could not be settled In
^Mannerheim, 309-310.
Moscow, the Soviet.Union would be forced to use "other
2methods” to achieve these ends, -
He continued to amplify his demands by stating that 
Leningrad was to be protected through the rectification of 
the Karelian border, and "firm and friendly" relations were
to be insured by a thirty-year lease on Hanko and the Soviet
0 Aacquisition of five small islands in the Gulf of Finland.
The Firms were willing to discuss the ■ islands,and the border,
but they refused to consider Hanko. Hanko was very important
to the Finnish economy, and a Russian presence there would
seriously compromise the nation's defense system. Since.the
Soviet acquisition of the islands in the Gulf of Finland
would effectively block the entrance to Leningrad, the Finns
believed that Russia, was only trying to gain a foothold in-
Finland in order to begin a more extensive program of con- 
97quest*"' As the talks drew to a close, Paasikivi optimis-.. 
tidaily conjectured that Finland wanted to remain at peace.- 
with the rest of the world and remain apart from all inci­
dents which might bring it into a war, Stalin answered this
p O
with an ominous, "That's impossible."
The German position of neutrality toward the
^ Soviet Documents, III, 382-384, 
2^Tanner, 29»
4],
negotiations took an even more definite form after the 
Moscow talks had ended in failure. On October 15 and 16,
Sven Hedin, a Swedish industrialist and explorer, had talks 
with Hitler and Goering on the future fate of the Northern 
neutrals. Reichsmarshal Goering informed Hedin that " ... 
Finland will be attached to Russia." The Fuehrer told him 
that Germany would continue its present policy of neutrality 
towards the North, and he believed that the Soviet demands 
on Finland were justifiable• Eitler■seemed piqued over, the 
anti-Nazi feeling in the North, and he felt that Finland had 
not been properly appreciative of the assistance that Germany
_ . pQhad given it in ±9 1 0."̂
The third and last round of the Russo-Finnish talks 
began again in Moscow on October 23= The negotiations 
followed the same obstinate pattern that the other two 
meetings had taken. Molotov and Stalin continued to p:
for Kanko, while Finland had determined to retain the port 
at any costh The talks were once again terminated at this 
point and tentatively scheduled to resume once more in 
November. When the Finnish diplomats made their farewells 
to Molotov and Stalin, the two communist leaders appeared to 
be cheerful, and the Finns fully expected that the talks
O G“'Tanne r, 8 2-8 3.
JQfhi ̂-j. \*J .i. ck a g j i
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would not be ended,,''
Even the official German news agency, DNB, was printing 
stories which intimated that the talks would resume in a few
O Odays,-; This, however, did not mean that the Reich was 
trying to steer the negotiations to a peaceful conclusion,,
The Foreign Office remained as aloof as ever on the matter.
The only other indication that the German Government was 
expecting a peaceful settlement came in an unofficial con­
versation hetween Vaino Tanner and Ambassador von Schulenburg 
at a dinner in Moscow, Schulenburg informed Tanner that his 
Foreign Office'presumed that there would be a settlement and 
he expected Finland eventually to lease Hanko
At this point in the war, Germany could still afford to 
ignore Finland. The country represented no outstanding eco­
nomic or military significance at the moment, The only 
German concern was the possibility of Sweden becoming involved 
in the dispute between Russia and Finland* Finland had con­
tinued to try to rekindle Sweden's interest in a bilateral 
defense of the Aalands throughout all of 1939« The popular 
sentiment in Sweden for such a cooperation was high, but the 
Swedish Government was distinctly cautious* In fact,,, the 
Finns had but one strong ally in the Swedish cabinet who
Tanner,
32Ibid,, 77* 
33Ibid *, 71,
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continued to promote the idea. Swedish Foreign Minister 
Rickard Sandler believed that the Soviet Union had designs 
on Sweden as well as Finland, and he felt that a Russian 
occupation of the Aalands represented a direct threat to 
his country's security.^ Sandler continued to prompt the 
Swedish Government to join Finland in the Aaland fortifica­
tion, but his attempts were not successful. He was even­
tually relieved of his post for his strong stand on the 
issue„
Sweden was not only afraid of Russia’s reaction to an 
alliance with Finland, but it was also forced to measure the 
'German views on the matter, Sweden was the main source of 
Germany’s supply of iron ore, and. if it were drawn into a 
Russo-Finnish war as an active combatant, Germany’s rela­
tionship with Sweden "would be seriously complicated in two 
ways. First of all, the Soviet Union would try to blockade 
the Gulf of Bothnia-' ana this would force Germany to face 
the decision of whether or not it should respect the Soviet 
move. Secondly, the richest of the Swedish iron fields were 
within easy reach of the Soviet Karelia, These fields would
"5 A'Scandinavia Between Fast and West, ed. by Heinrich 
Friis (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1950), 2??.
-^Tanner, 50*
36-' The Gulf of Bothnia was only used for the shipment of 
iron ore to Germany in the spring, summer, and fall. The 
Gulf froze over in late November, and remained ice bound 
until Anril.
be very vulnerable to a Soviet attack and difficult to ■ 
defend if the German army attempted to protect them. If 
Sweden did become involved In a war with Russia, the only 
other way that the 'Reich could protect Its interests in the 
North would be to,ally Itself with the Soviet Union. This 
would be a difficult decision at a time when the war In the 
Rest had not yet been decided.
Sweden, however, did not make Germany face any of these
theoretical problems. Prime Minister Hansson, on October 27?
informed the Finnish Government that Sweden did not want to
consider the bilateral fortification plans, as it thought
that this scheme would involve the country in a war with the 
3?.Soviet Union. Finland’s Isolation was now1 nearly complete, 
and Germany’s Immediate concern in the North was relieved for’ 
the. moment,
In November, the Soviet Union decided that nothing 
could be settled through a continuation of the talks with 
Finland. Instead of resuming the negotiations, it began to 
,apply the military pressure it had threatened In the past.-*® 
Later in the month, the USSR requested that the Finns with­
draw the troops which were stationed along the Karelian
3?Tanner, 47-^8.
38J It Is difficult to document the Russian decision to 
begin the war. It must have been considered as early as Octo­ber, because, at that time, Molotov had tried to get Arvo Tuominen, a Finnish radical, to come from Sweden to Moscow in order to discuss the details of forming a puppet Finnish Re­public • Tuominen refused to go and Kuusinenf was chosen instead.
b o r d e r . F i n l a n d  moved the men back a few kilometers in 
order to avoid any incidents which might provoke a Russian
ji c>attack. This Finnish discretion was not enough. The . 
Soviet Union claimed that a Finnish battery had fired on 
■Russian soldiers stationed near the village of Mainila on
h'lNovember 26. The Soviets refused to listen to Finnish
appeals on the so-called "Mainila Shots" and the Finnish-
Russian Non-Aggression Pact was denounced in Moscow on the
28th. On the morning of the 30th, the Russians launched.
a surprise air attack on Helsinki and the Winter War was 
'43Degun,
On December 1, the Soviet Union constructed and recog­
nized a puppet Democratic Peoples' Government of the Finnish 
Republic in the city of Terijoki. 0* ¥. Euusinen, a Finnish 
radical, who had fought for the communists in the War of 
Liberation in 1918, was chosen to head, the government. By 
December 3, the Soviets had "negotiated." a treaty with the
Kuusinen government which gave Russia all the territory that
All.it..had demanded earlier. ’ '
so'' Sovle t Documents, III, 4Q1 *
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During the opening stages of the war, Finland was 
anxious to seek peace. Histo Ryti, a banker, was chosen to 
head a new Finnish Government on December 1, and he tried to 
resume negotiations with the Soviet Union. Molotov, however, 
refused to negotiate with the "Ryti-Tanner .Government,"’ 
saying that he would recognize only the settlement which had 
been made by the Kuusinen regime in Terijoki.^
The Soviets desired and expected a speedy victory. A 
quick end to the hostilities would eliminate the possibility 
of'other nations coming to the aid of Finland, preserve 
Soviet military strength, and allow Russia to concentrate its 
attention on the developments that were taking place in the 
Balkans. At first, only troops from the Leningrad garrison 
were committed to the war, but it soon became apparent that 
other units would be needed. What victories■that were won in 
December were all Finnish ones,^°
Germany did nothing to alter its stand of complete 
indifference to Finland once the war had begun.. If anything, 
the Reich's Foreign Office developed an even more decided 
pro-Soviet line in order to allay any possible Russian sus­
picions* On December 2, Weizsaecker cabled all German 
missions to inform them that they were to reject any snti- 
Russian notes that they might be asked to receive. The
^ Soviet Documents, ill, 411. 
^Mannerheim, 327“3469 passim,.
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'German ministers were to say that the conflict should "be
^7thought of as a natural rectification of Soviet borders, '
At this point in the conflicts the Reich could look upon the 
winter war as an advantage to its overall military strategy. 
If' the war were a prolonged one, it would keep the Soviets 
busy in the North while Germany strengthened its position in 
the Balkans, At the same 11x11.83 it would help to exhaust 
Soviet military strength and make Russia more dependent on 
Germany, The German attitude toward the war would change 
only after the Allies indicated that they desired to send 
troops to Finland by way of Norway and Sweden,
As Finland's army held back the Soviet offenses, the 
Finnish Government attempted to gain outside aid and seek a 
negotiated peace, The early Finnish victories were encour­
aging, but the government realized that the army could not 
survive a long war of attrition without help. On December k, 
Rudolph Holsti asked the League of Nations to condemn the 
Russian Aggression and send aid to Finland, The League did, 
in its last official act, condemn the USSR, but this organ!-
2.nation was now so weak that the mandate received little
j, p
support, Finland had also requested that Germany and 
Sweden use their good offices, in order to approach the 
Soviets for possible terms for a negotiated settlement.
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 12?.
^Tanner, 106-108.
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Germany replied with its now characteristic no, and the 
Soviet Union still continued to assert that it would not
L\ C'negotiate with a government it no longer recognized. *
Virtually every nation in the world, with the notable 
exception of Germany, voiced-its support of the Finnish 
cause *• As this sympathy began to turn into support in the 
form of men and materiel, the Reich was forced to begin to 
revaluate its attitude* Hitler believed that the Scandi­
navian countries should be kept out of the war until the 
campaign in the West had been completed* If France ana 
Great Britain were defeated, there would then be no need to 
extend the war into the North* How, with volunteers crossing 
Norway and Sweden to Finland, the war could spread to the 
North before the Fuehrer was ready for it.5°.
Aid from nations which were as yet neutral in the war
did make its-way to Finland. By the end of the war, over
_  <1 —12,000 men had gone to Finland.-’- Even Italy, Germany’s
closest ally, did its best to send support. Some of this
Italian aid did gain transit through Germany and caused the
Soviet Union to question German neutrality*
On .December 9, von Sehulenburg cabled his Foreign Office
49DGFP, VIII, 'k86-k%8i and Tanner, 106-108..
5®Earl F, Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Opera' 
tions, 19^-0-19^5 (Washington, D.C. s Department of the Army 
Parnphle t, ”1959)» 7-10 *
 ̂j
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to' report that Molotov was furious over reports that Italy 
had sent fifty pursuit planes to Finland by German rail.^2 
Ribbentrop explained the matter by saying that Italy had 
received the transit rights before the Winter War had begun 
and that consent for the shipment had been withdrawn as soon 
as the war started. Some of the planes may have gotten 
through, but there was no cause for alarm.$3 Tass did con­
tinue to -publish reports of German arms shipments, but 
Molotov ended this dispute, but not his suspicions, when he 
•informed Ambassador Schulenburg that the matter had.been 
explained to his satisfaction."' ' Italy was able to supply 
Finland-with thirty fighter planes during the Winter War, 
but they were sent through Norway and Sweden.-^
Germany did seem to be sincere in its- attempt to remain 
neutral. Admiral Raeder recommended that no arms be sent to 
Finland, and Germany, was even hesitant to fulfill its arms 
commitments to Sweden lest these guns find their way to the 
Finns ,-5° The number of unarmed volunteers which had begun to 
pass through Norway and Sweden did not unduly alarm the
52dgpp$ viii, 506-50?*
53lbid,t 506-509, 514, 521*
^4Ibid;, 513-514? and Nazi-Soviet Relat1ons, 130*
-^Mannerheim, 37?,
^^Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German 
Navy {Washington, D «C .; U.S. Government Printing.Office, 194?), 
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Germans*, As early as December 6, Reichsmarshal Goering .told 
Count Rosen, the Swedish Ambassador to Berlin, that Germany 
would not object to Swedish volunteers going to Finland, nor 
would it consider the passage of volunteers from neutral 
countries as a casus belli ̂  The possibility of an Allied 
intervention through Scandinavia was an entirely different 
matter, Germany indicated in a vague manner that the Reich 
was not interested in seeing Sweden commit itself in the 
Winter War past the limits which had been prescribed by 
Goering„
For the Allies, the early months of World War.II had 
produced nothing but exasperation and frustration. They had 
not been able to stop the Wehrmacht from, conquering Poland, 
and now that the German army was assembling its might on the 
French borders, they had no cause for any optimism. At the 
time, it seemed impossible for the French and British to 
launch an offensive against Germany, so they were forced to 
wait and try to prepare for the next German move in the -West. 
The Winter War began to focus their attention to the North,
If a front in Sca.ndina.via could be opened with support' from 
Norway and Sweden, the whole complexion of the war might be 
changed.
On December 11, ‘Winston Churchill, who had already pro­
posed plans to mine Norwegian territorial waters and the
^Tanner, 160 „
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Rhine River, brought up the possibility of extending the war 
to the Worths The proposal was considered in the Foreign 
Office, and it was decided that the venture would be too 
risky. The plan might draw Russia into the war on Germany’s 
side, and there was no assurance that the Norwegians and 
Swedes would assist the plan.-^
At a meeting of the Allied Supreme War Council, French 
Premier Daladier announced that Prance was most anxious to 
aid Finland. y The French were by now- frenetic in their 
desire to see the war removed from their borders. Members 
of the French political right and left were sympathetic to- 
Finland9s cause, The French animosity toward .Russia was 
high, because it was felt that the Soviet Union had betrayed 
France by signing the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany after 
iv had signed a similar agreement with France. u The French 
hoped to parlay the Scandinavian sympathy for Finland into a 
durable coalition which would allow the war to be shifted 
from the West to the North. France realized the strategic 
importance of the Swedish iron ore, but it was mainly
C  ̂-J>°Sir Llewellyn 'Woodward, British Foreign Policy In the 
Second World War (Londons Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 
1962“), 19.
59 _Paul Keynaud, m  The Thick Of' The Fight, -trans. by
James D. Lambert (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955)* 254-.
k^Pertihax /Share- Geraud7« The Gravediggers of France ■ 
(New York; Doubleday, Doran, and Co., 1944), 14-1.
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6linterested in relieving some of the pressures at home»
The War Council decided to implement its new plans.by
sending a demarche to Norway and Sweden in order to gain
transit rights for an Allied passage through Scandinavia,
The Allies hoped to land at Narvik and Lulea, the Norwegian
ports from which Germany received most of its iron ore, and
then advance on to Finland after they had secured the iron
6?fields in northern Sweden# ~
The control of the Norwegian coast was starting to .become 
a top priority for the British. Up to this time, Britain' 
had not been able to halt the German shipments of Swedish 
ore which were coming f r o m  ports in 'western Norway, The Ger­
mans .freighted their shipments through the Norwegian Leeds, 
and their • ships ' stayed well within the fjord--protected terri­
torial waters of Norway.°-5 Britain was equally sympathetic 
with Finland, but it looked upon the proposed intervention 
in the Winter War primarily as a chance to curtail Germany's 
iron ore shipments. Churchill, then Britain's First Lord of 
the British Admiralty, was his country's chief proponent-.of 
extending the war to the North. He was willing to risk war 
with the Soviet Union, because he felt that Russia was /
^Pertinax /Andre Glraud/, The Gravediggers of .France 
(New York: Double day-, Doran, and Co,, 1944)., 142-144."'
°~¥. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol, I 
(London; His Majesty8s Stationery Office, 1952), 45.
A ̂-'Captain Donald MacIntyre, Narvik (New York; ¥. W.-' 
Morton and Co,-, 1959), 55.
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.'Ialready a German ally in everything but name6
The subject of the Swedish ore became even more impor­
tant when It was learned from Fritz Thyssen, a former German' 
industrialist then residing in France, that he believed that’
the war would be won by the side that could control the .
65ore,, ̂  The Allies then looked upon aid to Finland as a 
secondary effort to be completed when the primary targets in 
Norway and Sweden had been secured* The most immediate 
disadvantage to the Allied plans in Scandinavia was the fact 
that transit rights across Norway and Sweden would be hard 
to obtain.. These two countries wished to remain neutral, 
and they realized that the granting of passage rights -would 
be a casus belli for Germany. Anti-German.sentiment was high 
in Norway and Sweden, but their desire to remain neutral 
seemed even greater.
The war In Finland was now temporarily removed from the 
spotlight. However, since the Allies were counting on a 
continuation of this struggle to give them an excuse to 
invade Scandinavia, the Winter War was still of considerable 
international importance. If Finland weakened and the Soviet• 
Union threatened to establish itself on the borders of Norway 
and -Sweden, the Scandinavian governments might be willing to
6h•'Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering; Storm (Bostons 
Houghton Mifflin and Co,, 195-8), 551*
6 <-'Sir b'dward Spears, Assignment to Catastrophe, Vol. I 
(New Yorks A, A. Wynn, Inc,, 1955), "ST.
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grant transit to the Allies, If the war ended by negotia­
tion, the British and French would have to drop their guise
of aiding the Finns and launch a direct attack on a Scandi-
66navia which might offer resistance to their efforts, u
Finland now began to drop subtle hints to Ambassador
Bluecher that it would be forced to request Allied aid if
A 7Germany did not help ir to find a negotiated peace, (
Bluecher disobeyed prior instructions to remain aloof from 
the subject of a negotiated settlement and began to encourage 
the German Foreign Office to use its Influence at the Kremlin 
to bring an end to the war, Eis reports to Berlin painted a 
picture of despair in Finland. He said that a total Soviet 
victory would-completely halt the already interrupted ship­
ments of Finnish nickel, copper, and molybdenum} restrict 
traffic In the Baltics and spread Russian influence into
COnorthern Sweden. Bluecher was persistent In his efforts 
.to get the -Foreign Office to intervene, but he received only 
rebuke for his suggestions, Ribbentrop, In a tersely-worded 
cable, told him to; "Please refrain from any expression of
' 6osympathy for the Finnish position," '
The activities of the Soviet navy In the Baltic had
66Ziemke= , 23
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k^Ibid., 488
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caused some concern to the Reich, but even here the Germans
continued their policy of cooperation with the Soviet union,
Russia -was attempting to blockade the Gulf of Bothnia, in
order to try to stop the passage of supplies from Sweden to
Finland. The Kremlin requested that Germany aid its efforts
*7 0by allowing German steamers to resupply Soviet submarines.
Admirals Raeder and. Fricke gave their consent to the plan
because they believed that it would not restrict German
movement in that area and the favor might be used to extract
71future aid from the Soviet Union.•
Even though Germany had not yet chosen to become actively 
involved in the North, it was now forced to evaluate the four 
different courses of action which were developing in that 
area., These four courses were developing separately of each 
other, but they all seemed to be shaped b y 'the events of the 
Winter War,
The first line of action was being.determined by the 
Soviet Union. As long as the Russians persisted in their 
refusal to negotiate • an end to the 'Winter War, the Allies 
could continue to plan their expedition through Scandinavia 
'to relieve the Finns• As the war continued, the Scandina­
vians * anti-Soviet sentiment would increase, and this in turn 
would make them more amenable to cooperate with the Allies on
70dgpp, viii, 507.
71Ibid., 511-512
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the question of transit rights. Secondly, the Finnish 
Government, although it was anxious to end the war, was 
considering the offer of Allied aid. It had not as yet' 
given the Allies a formal request for help, but if the Soviet' 
Union seemed bent on a total victory, it would have no choice 
in the matter._ The third course of action that the Reich 
had to consider was whether Scandinavia would continue' to 
remain neutral. If the anti-German and anti-Soviet spirit 
began to outweigh the sentiment for neutrality, the Reich 
would have to consider intervention. The fourth threat in 
the Northern scheme was being shaped-in Britain and France, 
France was very anxious to begin operations In the North, 
but Britain was reluctant to attempt a campaign there unless 
• transit rights were received. Britain claimed 'that it was 
■trying to protect the rights of democratic nations In Europe,; 
and it believed that an attack on two neutral nations would 
tarnish Its image as the protector of the smaller nations.
This, then, was the situation In the North in December of 
1939» The Winter War had not caused all' of these new develop­
ments by itself, but’ it was a primary contributing factor to 
them.
Paralleling the Allied scheme of Intervention were the 
German plans to counter any possible threat in the North,
Late in Decembers the German Naval Attache"" in Stockholm had 
told the Swedish Government that It should remain "benevolently
5?
r/0neutral" towards Finland. The unqualified suggestion of 
benevolent neutrality did give the Swedish Government con­
siderable latitude in its attempt to aid. Finland with 
volunteers and war materiel? however, the Swedes delivered 
the aid with considerable caution,, The aims which were sent 
were made to appear as though they had been purchased by 
Finland, and all volunteers were forced to travel across 
Sweden unarmed and in civilian c l o t h e s O n  January 2, 
Prince zu Wied, the German representative to Stockholm, told 
Foreign Minister Gunter that Germany was studying the effect 
that Western assistance to Finland would have on Sweden's 
neutrality» The Swedish minister to Berlin was also informed 
on January 4 that cooperation with the Western powers in
their attempt to aid Finland, " .., would not be consistent
'/Awith Swedish neutrality."' ' Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Halvdan Koht said that he believed Norwegian assistance to 
the Allied plan would cause a German attack on Norway.^
The German diplomatic line being employed in early 
January put pressure on Norway and Sweden, but it did not 
contain any explicit threats. At first, no concrete
79'“Co Leonard LundIn, Finland in the Second NorId War
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 60.
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limitations were placed on the Scandinavian aid to Finland,
but Sweden and Norway were given tacit reminders that Allied
intervention would be a casus belli» Major-General von
Uthman, the German Military Attache*to Sweden, told the
Swedish cabinet that his Foreign Office was becoming "deeply
concerned" with the segment of public opinion that called for
?6active intervention in the Winter War,' in the face of the 
German concern, Sweden decided that it would not honor the 
Allied request for transit rights which had been made on 
December 19, 1939® On January 4,•Sweden informed Great Bri­
tain that it would not allow a free passage to Finland ?
Norway issued a similar statement on January 15® ̂
Behind this diplomatic pressure lay German military 
plans to end. any possible threat in the North* In early• 
December Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the Norwegian National 
Union Party and a Nazi sympathizer, made one of his periodic'' 
trips to Berlin for a conference with Hitler* While there, 
he spoke of the pro-British influence in the Norwegian 
government and intimated that a secret treaty which would 
allow the Allies to occupy Norway if the country were threat­
ened by Germany existed ^  Ets comments accented the sup­
positions which had a,lready been made by Admiral Baederi
^°Lundin, 
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If Germany continued its plans in the V/est, Britain might
well launch a surprise attack on the North. Hitler did not
want to divert his attention from the West, but he did allow
the OKviPto begin a s tu d y  for an invasion of Norway. The OXW
plans became known as Studie IMord, and they grew from Hitler*!
original limited objectives of controlling key ports in
western Norway to the total occupation of both Norway and 
80Denmark. On January 10, Hitler released' Studie Nord to the
Pservice high commands for further study.
During January, the Finnish army continued to hold its 
own against the Russians* All fronts remained stable, s/nd 
the military situation was not yet critical. However well 
the war might have been going at that time, Finland still 
realized the inevitable conclusion of a protracted struggle. 
Finland, then, continued to look for a country which would 
mediate a peaceful end to the war, and It looked upon Sweden 
and Germany as the countries that it would like to have act 
as intercessors. On January *5, Foreign Minister Tanner 
called Bluecher to his office and asked him if'Germany could 
now try to act as a mediator In the war. Bluecher felt that
^The 0K¥ (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) was the German 
Armed'Forces High Command.
Qf)Franz Haider, The Private Uar Journal of Generaloberst 
Franz Haider, 15- August 1939 to 2k- September 199-2 (mimeo­
graphed), III, 5, 3« Hereafter cited as Haider Diaries.
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this was a bad time to try to begin the negotiations. The
Soviet Union had not yet won a significant victory in the
war, and he believed that Russia would not come to the con-
8?ference table until it had begun to win the war,
Weizsaeclcer informed Ambassador Bluecher on January 17 that
Bibbentrop wanted him to tell Tanner that there was no hope
that Germany could help to end the war,83
During the last half of January, Germany began to alter
its diplomatic course slightly. The weather had indefinitely
postponed any offensive in the'West, and Studie Nord had been
P,Ll■recalled for additional planning„ Admiral B&eder did not 
believe that a British invasion of Norway was immiment, and.
P £he called for a continuation of the status quo in the North.-'
     ^
Whether the military strategy in Studie Nord had any material 
effect on Germany's diplomatic line on the Winter war is 
difficult to assess. Admiral Raeder did believe that the 
war was causing popular opinion in Norway and Sweden to 
continue its call for active intervention. The Admiral also 
realized that the British would meet only-a token amount of 
resistance■to an attack if the current pro-Finnish attitude
Q ̂were to continue in Norway, ° It is entirely possible that
82Tanner, 117-118,
83pGFP, VIII, 677.
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Germany hoped to relieve some of the tension in the North 
by. offering Finland at least the hope of a peaceful solution,.
On January 2k, Tanner intercepted a phone call made by 
Bluecher to the German Foreign Office, During the course of 
the conversation, Bluecher was' told, to say that German 
mediation might be considered.0' Even oefore the Finns could 
begin to take advantage of this new development, Germany 
begem to contact the Soviet Union on its own. Von Tippleskirch, 
the Secretary to the German Embassy in Moscow, had made an 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the Winter 
War, He saw the disadvantages asi (1) the rise of anti- 
German sentiment in the North, (2) the loss in trade with 
Finland and Russia, and (3) the danger of Britain and France 
trying to intervenes On the side of the advantages werej 
(1) the postponement of Hus Siam designs on Bessarabia,, (2) 
the easing of Soviet tensions with Japan, and (3) the growing
Q pdependence of the USSR on Germany,0 The day after this 
assessment was made, Ambassador Schulenburg called on 
Molotov, Schulenburg asked Molotov•how long he thought the 
Winter War would last. He also pointed out that the war was 
hurting Russo-German trade relations, as the Soviet Union was 
finding it increasingly difficult to fill its trade commit­
ments, Molotov replied that German?/ would simply have to
8^Tanner, 122;
88dgpp» viii, 706-707.
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accept the trade difficulties. He continued by saying that 
■the Soviet Union still refused to negotiate with the 
Byti-Tanner Government., and to the question as to whether he 
would confer‘with Pehr .Svinhufvud should he be elected 
President of Finland, Molotov said, "Maybe,
Molotov’s "maybe" was deceptive in that the Soviet Union 
had already been contacted by its Ambassador to Sweden,
Madame Kollontai, on the possibility of beginning negotiations 
with Finland. On January 29, the Swedish Foreign Office 
received a communique from the Soviet Union which said that 
it did not regard a settlement with the Byti-Tanner Govern­
ment , " „»» as being in principle unattainable. *' However, 
before any talks could begin, the Soviet Union would have to 
know in advance what concessions Finland would be willing to 
make.9° The Finnish reply, which was made on February 2, 
said that Finland was willing'to resume the negotiations 
which had been suspended, in November, It was willing to cede 
land on the Karelian Isthmus and neutralize the Gulf of 
Finland under an international convention, but it 'was not
O' i‘willing to cede territory that would endanger its security.^" 
On February 5» the Soviet Union informed Finland through the 
Swedish Foreign Office that it could not accept these terms
89DGFPt VIII, 708-709.
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On the same day that the Soviet Union informed Finland 
that it was not yet ready to negotiate, the Supreme Allied 
War'Council was considering once again an attack on Norway 
which would precede an attempt to relieve Finland. Britain 
had come to begin a more serious consideration of an attack 
on N a r v i k , a n d  the French seemed to be,ready to send aid 
to Finland as soon as possible® Paul Reynard, who was 
shortly to become Premier of Prance, reported that the council 
had decided to send thirty thousand men to Narvik. He also 
stated:
When this body had been raised, the Allies 
after having persuaded Finland to call them 
to her aid, would use this appeal to ask 
Norway and Sweden to permit the passage of 
the troops. If this were rejected, -'There 
would be grounds,8 Dal&dier stressed, 'for 
ignoring the refusal apd carrying out the 
■ ope ration aespi te it* * '̂L'
Winston Churchill was still the chief British proponent 
of active intervention. He said, '"Small nations must not 
tie our hands when wo are fighting for their rights and . 
freedoms*"95 The-expeditionary force to be sent was to be 
under British command, but no definite date was set for its
9%2annerheim, 380-381 *
9 ynaud, 2 5 «
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departure« The Allies still seemed unsure of the resistance
that they might meet in Scandinavia, and they continued to
ofiseek Finland3s call for assistance.
As a coincidence, it was also on February 5 that the 
German plans for an invasion of the North began to take 
their final form. Studie Nord had been examined while Hitler 
had postponed the attack on France until March. The pro­
posed invasion of Norway had now' received the operational 
code name of ’Ness erne bung, and Captain Theodor Xrancke, the 
Commanding Officer of the cruiser Scheer, was made the senior 
officer for the staff that would continue to modify the plans, 
The subsequent Krancke Plans envisioned the occupation of 
six strategic coastal areas: the Oslo Fjord, Sta.vanger,
Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, and Tromso. Air bases in northern 
Denmark were to be used in the operation, ana, in order to 
lessen the Norwegian resistance, the Government was to be 
told that the occupation would terminate as soon as the war
had ended.
Operation Me s s e rue bung was as yet only a tactical 
exercise. Hitler had not decided to implement the plan yet, 
but he became more and more concerned with the Allied pres­
sure on Norway in February.
The vulnerability of the German position in the North
 ̂hanne m e  lia, 3o±„
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Sea was demonstrated on February lo« On that' day, six 
British destroyers halted the German tanker Altmark in Nor­
wegian territorial waters and removed three-hundred captured
O f“1British seamen,‘/U The seizure of the prisoners Illustrated 
the’ tenuous safety of the Norwegian Leeds, and further seemed 
to indicate the assistance that Norway might give to Britain. 
Two Norwegian torpedo boats had been accompanying the 
Altmark, but they refused, to try to repel the British cruisers 
Once Operation wesssrnebung began to take form, the 
Germans decided that there was less need for them to try to 
start negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union,
Still, the German Foreign Office displayed a quiet concern 
that the talks begin as soon as possible. On February 13, 
Bluecher received a cable from Ribbentrop which stated that 
Germany did not want to act as a mediator yet, but he could 
not predict how that decision would change In the next few 
weeks. He did give Bluecher permission to try to find out 
what Finlandfs terms for a negotiated settlement would be, 
and he was also to attempt to arrange for Berlin to be used 
as a -possible site for talks.̂  On February 17, Bluecher 
did approach Tanner to suggest Berlin as a site for future 
negotiations with the Soviet Union, He was careful to say 
that the idea was his own so that Tanner would not think
O QChurchi11, 56^-565} and Ziemke, 16,
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that the German Foreign Office had altered its neutral
1 ooposition* Tanner anc. Bluecher conversed again on
February 209 and the Finnish Foreign Minister refused to tell 
the Ambassador if Finland were negotiating for Allied aid.lwl 
Bluecher had become either quite alarmed with the situation 
or else he 'was trying to frighten his Foreign Office into 
trying to open talks with Russia when he filed a report on 
the situation in Finland on February 22* In the situation 
paper, he stressed that the Soviet penetration of the Manner- 
helm Line- had made the Finnish Government much more anxious 
to receive outside aid* Bluecher felt that it would be best 
for Germany to try to end the winter War before the Allies
. - . . x. . • • 102naci an opportunity to intervene*
The subtly-phrased German overtures were not enough'for 
the Finns* The Finnish Foreign Office was now weighing the 
Allied offer of assistance against the progress of the , 
Swedish attempt to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
The German attitude toward the Finnish dilemma had changed, 
but it had not changed, sufficiently to guarantee that It 
would or even could bring an end to the hostilities*
Marshal Mannerheim, the Finnish Commander-in-chief, felt 
that his army was holding out as well as could be expected*
1qoDGPP8 VIII, 7?8-779*
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but he was In favor of trying to negotiate a peace, he felt
i n othat Allied, aid should be requested only as a last resort.
On February 20* M&nnerheim received British General Ling and 
Colonel Ganeval of the. French Army. These officers had been 
sent to Helsinki to help clarify the Allied plans. They 
explained that an attack on Norway had been planned, but they 
expected that a German counterattack would perhaps prevent 
any assistance from reaching Finland * Ganeval also told
Tanner that the Allies were to attempt a passage across 
Scandinavia with or without transit rights, and the Swedish 
iron fields would have to be secured before any of the expe­
ditionary force could be sent to Finland, Tanner*s evaluation
of this information caused him to say, "On this basis Finland
_L 0 ̂ -assumed a pretty dubious a t t i t u d e H e  realised that 
Finland was being used as an excuse to help the Allies secure 
more important military targets. A Finnish request for the 
Allied aid began to center on three as yet unanswered ques­
tions; (1) How many volunteers would there be? (2) Would
Norway and Sweden grant the transit rights? and (3) Would
j 06the assistance arrive in time to be'of any help?
The Soviet Union furthered the possibility of negotiations
Tanner, 152-153 *
“^‘Hlannerheim, 381 =
10^Tanner, 170-171.
1 nb" Ibid., 173i-
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yihen It forwarded. Its minimal demands to the Swedish Porelg 
Office on February 24. In order for negotiations to be 
successful, Finland would have to be willing to cede Eanko, 
the entire Karelian Isthmus, and the northeastern shore of
1 07Lake Ladoga,~ ‘ Tanner left for Stockholm to meet with 
Madame Kollontai on February 26. As soon as he arrived, he 
spoke to Finland8s ambassador to Sweden. He. told Kivlmaki 
that the Germans had advised him to make peace even If the 
terms were unfavorable. He believed that Germany had made 
an attempt to act as mediator, but Russia had turned the
i A Oproposal down® On February'28, the Finnish Diet announc
that It would consider the Soviet demands as a point of 
departure for the talks *-^9
As soon as Finland decided to negotiate, the Allies 
began, to press the question of intervention. On March I, t 
British Ambassador to Finland, Gordon Vereker, told Tanner, 
"If the Scandinavian countries do not permit the Western 
forces to pass through their territories so much the worse
 ̂ /'s
for them." To amplify the confusion that surrounded
Allied intentions, Tanner noted that Vereker informed him 
two days later that he did not know what the Allies would
1 07. a. U  (Tanner# 172.
108Ib.Id8, 180,
I09Ibid., 194-195; 
Tanner, 199*110m
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1 i *1 _do If transit rights were not given.Xxx it did seem that
Prance was most anxious to see the plans begin. Without -.
consulting Britain, Premier Daladier, on March 2, promised
to send forty to fifty thousand men to Finland. When
Churchill heard of this offer he felt that it was foolish
in view of the Impending German attack on France and Bel- 
112giura. The possibility of Allied aid actually arriving was
lessened when Tanner received word from Sweden that it would 
attempt to stop troop passage by force if Germany requested 
them to do so.1^
Upon the advice of Marshal Mamie rheim that the army 
could not hope to hold out much longer, the Finnish Govern­
ment decided to negotiate and not request Allied aid,1^
On March 6, Molotov said that an armistice could begin if 
the’ city of Vlipuri and Viipuri Bay were evacuated. These 
conditions were reluctantly met, and the talks began at the 
Kremlin on March
Even at'this late date, the Allies continued to press 
the Finns to accept their offer of assistance. On March 9, 
the Finnish Ministers in Paris and London were told that, if
xx"Tanner, 205• 
112Churchills 573=
1^^Tanner, 210.
1 i lx
■ x" '‘Mamierheim, 387. 
xi^Tanner, • 213.
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Finland would issue a call for help, the Allies would come 
to their aid with all possible speed. They promised to 
deliver one-hundred bombers in two weeks, but the dispatch 
of the troops was still dependent upon the attitude of
i -i ANorway and Sweden on transit rights 0-LJ-u Because of the 
uncertainty of the situation, Marshal Mannerheim gave his 
categorical opinion that the Soviet terms should be accepted. 
On March 12, just hours before the Busso-Finnish peace talks 
reached their conclusion, Allied troops boarded British ships 
for a "peaceful" invasion of Norway. A landing was to be 
made at Narvik to test the degree of Norwegian resistance, 
and then, If the troops found the Norwegians to be coopera­
tive, the rest of the force was to land at Bergen and Sta- 
vinger. After the Finns signed the peace treaty In Moscow, 
the two divisions were diverted to Prance and the Invasion 
was cance1led;11?
Hitier5s attitude toward Finland had remained completely 
unchanged during the course of the developments in February 
and early March. The Fuehrer realized that the Winter War 
had caused the focal point of the war to shift to the North, 
but he also realized that he could-gain security in Scandi­
navia without Intervening In Finland and thereby causing a 
diplomatic breach with the Soviet union. On March, b, in,a
^^^Mannerheim, 388, 
li7Churchill, 573.
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second conversation with Sven Hedin, Hitler said that Ger­
many’s sympathy remained with Russia. He added that he 
would intervene in the North only if the Allies tried to
I i Dcross Norway and Sweden.—  In a letter to Mussolini on
March 8, Hitler again declared that "Germany had no parti-
11 Qcular obligations toward Finland." 7
Hitler could well afford to ignore Finland In view of
the fact that Norway and.Sweden were continuing to refuse
transit rights to the Allies and his own plans for invading
the North were progressing rapidly. On February 21, General
Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, who had led the German expedition
to Finland in 1918, was given the command of Operation
Nesseruebung. 'Hitler, on March. 1, then issued his "Directive
for Case Iv esse ruebnngi; and established the primary object Ives
of the invasion. The strategic objectives were to forstall
an Allied invasion of Norway and to provide security for the
120Swedish iron fields.'" Admiral Baeder believed that a 
prompt execution of the plan was Imperative in order to pre­
vent the Allied Invasion under the pretext of sending aid to 
121Finland* When.Allied submarines were spotted off the
Skagerrak on the 13th, an immediate implementation of
•L~°DG?1F, • VIII, 862-864.
^-^Ibld., 87?o 
■^^Ziemke, 18-19*
"^“Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, 20.
Operation Wesseruebung was readied; but when the Eusso-Finni 
Peace Treaty went into effect and the submarines withdrew 
on the 15th, Hitler felt that the' invasion of Norway could
1 opthen proceed "without excessive haste F'
The peace treaty that Finland signed on the evening of
the 12th was harsh, Finland was forced to cede all of the
Karelian Isthmus,' lease Hanko, build a railroad to connect
northern Finland to Soviet Karelia, and proraise not to make
any alliances which would be directed against the Soviet 
1 2 2Union. J Finland’s line of defense was .now impaired, .its,
economy in ruins, and its Isolation conrolete. Russia had
not achieved the total victory that It desired, but it had
made Inroads which could be used to pressure Finland into ,
cooperating with the Soviet Union In the future.
In an Itemized account of his estimation of the future
effects of the Russo-Finnish Treaty. Bluecher predicted that
(1) Russia would now control the Gulf of Finland and the"
central portion of the Baltic, (2) Finland would no longer
be'able to ally Itself with Scandinavia, and (3) future
1 24tensions in the Baltic had to be anticipated,
The Winter War had given Germany serious problems to
12?"'Ziemke, 20.
"hor the complete text of the Russo-Finnish Peace 
Treaty see Soviet Documents, III, 421-423.
contend with. The invasion of France had to be postponed, 
its supply of iron ore had been threatened, and an ultimate 
invasion of Norway had to be contemplated and prepared for. 
Throughout this period of crisis, the Reich continued to 
honor its prior commitments to the Soviet Union. The rela­
tionship between Germany and Russia had not been a cordial 
one, but the Reich did allow the Soviet Union to attempt - to 
spread its sphere of influence northward into Finland. To 
German;/, Finland was still just the price that it had to pay 
for Soviet cooperation while it continued its campaign in 
the West*
CHAPTER III 
THE INTERIM
After the signing of the Russo “-Finnish Peace Treaty*, 
the German OKW theorised that* since the Allies had now lost 
their pretext for invading Norway, the immediate pressure to 
act in the North was relieved and Operation Wesseruebung was 
temporarily cancelled,. Hitler, however, was not deluded into 
believing that Britain had given up all hope of stopping 
Germany's supply of iron ore. As long as Great Britain 
maintained its naval superiority in the North Sea, it could 
decide to defend the Norwegian Leeds and accomplish its 
strategic objectives without invading the mainland. Prompted 
by Admiral Raeder to face the problem, which seemingly could 
only be overcome by an invasion of Norway, Hitler announced 
that April 9 would be "Messer Day,"1
On ■ the morning of April 9, the German Blitzkreig began 
to move through Denmark and Norway. The campaign to conquer 
Norway proved to be more difficult than had been expected.
The German navy lost the heavy cruiser Blueoher, and the 
Scharnhorst ana the Enelsenau were badly damaged. The army 
met stiff resistance from the Allies in and around Narvik,
^Ziemkes 19-22,
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but Norway was taken with a loss of only 1,31? killed, a 
small number for such an Important victory. By June 3, the 
Allies had evacuated their forces from Norway, ana on June 9 
the Norwegian army, surrendered. By this victory, Hitler had 
made himself the undisputed master of the Baltic Sea and 
Scandinavia,̂
The Winter War had left Finland independent but very 
close to the brink of economic, military, and political ■ 
disaster. Now that trade with Great Britain had been all but 
stopped,-5 Finland had to begin to- find new markets. Even if 
Finland could find other markets, it was doubtful that the 
nation could redevelop its productive capacity for a number 
of years. The areas in the south which had been ceded .to. 
Russia contained most of Finland's limited industry, and 
what plants that had not been confiscated by the Soviet Union 
were destroyed in the war. The Soviet acquisition of Salla 
and the area surrounding it gave the Russians a salient from 
which to launch an attack into central Finland. The Manner- 
heim Line had been lost with the cession of the Karelian 
'Isthmus, ana the, Soviet troops In Hanko threatened Finland."s 
western coast. In the north, the Russians had acquired the 
western half of the Rybaehiy Peninsula, Prom this vantage
^Zlemke, 109-112
^In the pre-war years, Great Britain had been receiving 
over fifty per cent of Finland’s exports.
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point, they could threaten Finland’s only port in the' north
and possibly control the rich nickel fields of Petsamo to
the south# If the Soviets decided to resume the war, it
could develop a series of irresistible pincer movements
which would fragment and. conquer Finland» In June, when
Norway and France were going down to defeat, Finland was
\
isolated, from the best. The conquest of Norway blocked the 
path of any new Allied support. The defeat of Norway also 
isolated Sweden, making- it impossible for a Finno-Swedish 
alliance because of Sweden's new dependence on Germany. The 
fall of Prance eliminated the Allied presence on the Conti­
nent, and allowed Hitler to strengthen his gains and prepare 
for new ones, With Germany and the Soviet Union as the two
remaining Continental powers, Finland’s destiny now lay in 
htheir hands.' A distinct political triangle was now being 
formed In reference to Finland. Germany would begin to be­
come more Interested in Finland, and the Soviet Union would 
increase its everpresent interest,1 Finland,- caught at the 
apes of the triangle, would be forced to look to both the 
East and the West as it became the subject of the conflicting 
German and Hussian strategies.
It is not entirely clear why the Soviet Union chose to 
halt the Winter War when it did. The threat of Allied Inter­
vention, the growing Nazi influence in southern Europe, and
Li,
'M arinerheiin , 3 8 2 -3 9 5 *  passim.*
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the toll of men and material enacted by the fierce Finnish 
resistance, all played, a part in bringing an early end to 
the struggle. ¥hat is certain is the fact that the Soviet 
’ union continued to,fear and distrust the Nazis, and it was 
not at all pleased by the rapid German victories in the Nest. 
The Russians had. hoped that German.}/ would become involved in 
a long war of attrition so that they could, solidify their 
own gains in the Baltic. Russia had halted its military• 
advance into Finland, but it by no means intended to stop 
political pressures. Germany, on the other hand, was now 
occupied with Operation'Sea Lion, the plan that it hoped would 
materialize in the invasion and conquest of Great Britain. 
Germany, as long as it was still tied down in the West,, .was 
content to allow Russia to maintain its sphere of influence 
in the Baltic.
The immediate Finnish reaction to the conquest of .Norway- 
was mixed. The Finns were sympathetic with Norway, but the 
extension of the war to the North did not cause a wave of 
anti-Nazi hysteria. Finland was forced to evaluate the new 
political realities of Europe, The evaluation of the latest, 
events produced the realization that Hitler was the master of 
Europe . It was then felt that Finland should begin to 
implement a policy of Realpolitik in its future relations, 
with the Reich.-'
•5Anthony F . Upton, Finland in Crisis, 1940-1941 (ithaca
Cornell University Press, I9o47~I 91-94,
ryO/'O
Germany"s first indication of its latent interest in
Finland came shortly after the winter War had ended, The 
- Reich"s Economic policy Department issued a memorandum on 
March 28 which stated that an economic agreement should be 
concluded with Finland " ,., to forestall, similar wishes on
s
the part of Russia and the'Western Powers,”D The report con- 
■tinned with an assessment .of the possible bases of a future 
trade relationship. The level of Finland's pre-war produc­
tion was severely reduceds but Germany hoped that the pro-
ieeded by the Reich would soon begin,\ vm . . . t J__0
Finland's entire production of copper had been going to
Germany and the shipments were to be resumed as soon as 
'transportation difficulties were cleared up. Nickel was the 
metal.most desired by the Germans, but the future shipments 
•of this commodity was clouded by several political problems. 
First of ally the mines in the Petsamo region were being 
operated by a Canadian concessionaire, the bond Nickel Cor­
poration, 'If the company continued its lease, it undoubtedly 
would refuse to sell its ore to Germany, Secondly, the Ger­
man government had negotiated an agreement in October, 1939* 
which proposed to send one-hundred and thirty-four anti­
aircraft guns to Finland in exchange for a promise to increase 
the production of copper and nickel, Only fifty of the guns 
had been sent to Finland before the outbreak of the Winter
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War, and it was. felt that the Finnish Government would press 
for the delivery of the other eighty-three guns before a 
new agreement on the nickel could be made. This was thought 
to be impossible because of the Russian objections that would 
arise from a rearmament of Finland. The most ominous threat 
to successful trade in nickel was the fact that the Soviet 
Union was beginning to show considerable interest in 
obtaining the Pets&mo concession for itself. Germany, if 
Russia continued to press its claims on the area, would have 
to choose between implementing its own economic interests in 
the area and the continuation of friendly relations with the 
USSR. Still another difficulty in establishing economic 
intercourse with Finland was the fact that the Finns would 
want to export large quantities of wood products to Germany 
in exchange for finished metal goods, a commodity the Reich 
could not afford to export because of its own war needs.
Karl Schnurre>was sent to Helsinki on April 8 to act as a 
.special plenipotentiary in negotiating a trade program,^
The German Foreign Office had already begun a discreet 
appraisal of the Soviet attitude toward the Petsamo question 
before it made any firm commitments with the Finns. In the 
course of a conversation on the Russo-Finnish Peace Treaty, 
Ambassador Schulenburg inquired about the future fate of 
Petsamo. Molotov Informed him.that the Soviet Union had
?DGFPt IX, 32-35.
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allowed Finland to retain Petsamo on the condition that .no
military bases would be constructed there and.no Allied .war- .
P.ships would be allowed to be stationed in the northern ports,■ 
The German plans to invade' Norway and Denmark would 
naturally disturb the Soviet Union, and plans to begin even 
the slightest influence in the eastern Baltic would cause a 
major shift in the diplomatic climate between, the two coun­
tries. On April 7? Ribbentrop instructed von. Schulenburg to. 
inform Molotov, once the invasion had begun, that "Sweden'and 
Finland will in no way be affected by our plans." He was 
also to explain that the occupation of Norway would help the 
USSR in that it would prevent any future reopening of the 
Finnish question by the British and French.9 These assurances 
were meant to allay any Soviet suspicions, but because the 
northern borders of Norway overlapped those of Sweden and 
extended to the very edge of Petsamo, the German army would 
then be within a short distance of Murmansk and the Murmansk 
Railroad. With this in mind, the Soviet fears and feelings 
of insecurity could not help but be increased by the inva­
sion. On April 11, after Schulenburg had completed his talks 
with Molotov, he noted an "unfavorable shift" in Soviet atti­
tude. Molotov was worried that the war,would move to Sweden 
and then to the eastern Baltic. A concrete example of the
8DGFP, IX, ■ 37-^0,
9ibia;, 137-138.
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new Soviet attitude was displayed when Molotov announced 
that Russia would not honor its promise to supply Germany
1 nwith the northern naval base it had promised earlier. The 
Soviet Union obviously felt that German influence was 
spreading rapidly enough by itself i\Tithout adding to it.
The April trade negotiations with Finland. produced no 
firm results, but Germany did make it known that it was 
interested in Petsamo, Finland was reluctant to give broad 
trade concessions to Germany at a time when Russia was 
beginning to make its post-war claims on the country. The 
Soviet Union was particularly disturbed that Finland had 
removed machinery from the areas that had been ceded by the 
treaty. Although there had been no clause in the treaty 
which stated that the machinery was to be given to the
1 1Soviets, they maintained that the transfer had been implied. 
While Germany was still unwilling to give any protective 
assurances to Finland, the Finns were reticent to cooperate 
in areas that they knew would offend Russia. However, moves 
to strengthen ties with Germany were made. One notable move 
to establish a rapport with the Reich was the.appointment of 
Professor T. M. Kivimaki as the new ambassador to Germany. 
Kivimaki had held high government posts and his pro-German
10DGFP, IX,' 138-140.
^ F inland Reveals Her Secret Documents, (New York: 
Wilfred Funis;, Inc., l^TTj 7~9»
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i pleaning was a recognized fact, ~
Trade talks with Finland resumed in.early June. At 
this■session, Germany said that It wished to take over the-. 
Petsamo concession In the near future. The Finns were still 
reluctant to go this far, but they did promise that Germany 
would receive seventy-five per cent of the ore once produc­
tion resumed. Since the agreement could not -possibly go 
Into effect at that time, It was not communicated to the 
Soviet Union.^
On June 1^, the German army began to occupy Finnmark, 
the northernmost province of Norway, With troops stationed 
at Kirken.es, the largest city in the province, the Nazis were 
In a position to exert a military control over Petsamo if It
*1 h
so desired„ It was by no coincidence then that on June 23 
Molotov informed Finnish Ambassador Paasikivi that Russia 
wanted to obtain the Petsamo nickel concession, Paasikivi 
told Molotov that such a plan was not possible since the 
Mond Nickel Company already had the concession rights.^  
Several days later, Molotov Informed paasikivi that his 
government was not only interested in the Petsamo nickel, 
but it was interested in the area itself. He said that it
Upton, .100®
13Ibid., 106-10?»
1 h’Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 50-51' 
■^Ibid®, 51,
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1 f\was necessary to eliminate British influence in the area.10
Great Britain did continue to carry on a very limited trade
with Finland through the ports in the north, but the Soviet
anxiety could only have been caused by the recent German
occupation of Finnmark. If the Soviet Union could control
the narrow sleeve that separated Finnmark from Soviet Karelia,
it could observe the military build up in the .area.
The completion of the Finno-German contract on the
Petsamo nickel had to be delayed because of the new Soviet
demands. The German Embassy had informed Molotov that the
Reich was interested in obtaining nickel from the area, but
it did not tell him that negotiations had begun, Molotov
told Schulenburg that the Soviet Union was ready to guarantee
Germany fifty per cent of the Petsamo output and the German
request for.seventy-five per cent of the ore would receive
17"sympathetic study," Germany pretended to negotiate with
Russia for a percentage of the nickel, but it was still felt
that a Soviet control of the area would severely complicate
the acquisition of the nickel. The Soviet Union might be
willing to give Germany a majority of the ore, but constant
negotiations would be required to insure that the German
18demands were met.
1 Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 51•
iyLG?3', IX, 8?,
l8Ibid,, 108-109 »
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On July 4, Bluecher reported from Helsinki that pro-
German sentiment in Finland was growing in "avalanche
proportions." He felt that efforts were being made to
establish a pro-German government, but he had cautioned
various Finnish leaders that the sentiment should not be.
developed too quickly or the Soviet Union would become sus-:
IQpicious, '
The pro-German sentiment in Finland was a result 'of a': 
renewed anti-Soviet hatred. Finland’s post-war policy of 
trying to cooperate with the Soviet Union had produced ■very 
little results. The USSB was looking for security, not 
amiable relationsand to strengthen its position in the 
North, Russia had to continue to make extensive demands on 
Finland. On July 9s the Finnish Foreign Ministry was in­
formed that Article 4 of the peace treaty, which gave the 
Soviets the lease on Hanko, would have to be supplemented 
so that Soviet trains could run on Finnish rails to the port.20 
■The Soviet Union’s pretext for the request was that it was 
difficult to supply its station there by sea. In reality 
it wanted to establish a line of communication through 
southern Finland which could be used in time of war.
Later In the month the Soviet Union did soften its 
stand on the Petsamo question. It Informed Finland that it
'■ . 19pGFP, IX, 121-122.
O Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 53•
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would settle for an agreement which would give it forty per 
cent of the nickel production for 19;40 if the remaining
o isixty per cent would go to Germany.‘T* This decision meant 
that only the most immediate problem concerning the Petsamo 
nickel had been temporarily settled., The dispute on conces­
sion rights would continue for the next eleven months*
If there is a decisive turning point in Nazi Germany's 
diplomatic attitude toward Finland, it would have to be 
dated from July 22, 19^0. On this day-, Hitler, in a meeting 
with his General Staff, said that a -possible Invasion of
.Russia had to be planned and Finland was mentioned as a
22gateway of attack* . Up to this time, any German interest in 
Finland had to be tempered by the conditions of the Nazi- 
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Now, as the plans for the Inva­
sion of Russia progressed, Germany could afford to discount 
the effect that its influence In Finland would have on its 
relations with the Soviet Union. The Reich would now only 
have to mask the inroads it was making into Finland so Russia 
’would -not become unduly suspicious and begin to anticipate 
the attack that was forthcoming.
The initial plans that were being developed were as yet 
very nebulous and Intended as hypothetical preparations for 
a possible course of action. The preliminary plans were born
2^Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 5^> and DGFP.
IX, 185-1851 "
22Halder Diaries. IV, 128,
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of the frustration that accompanied the extended delay In 
the proposed invasion of Great Britain, The British Isles 
had ’withstood the seige of Britain, and the British domina­
tion of the sea plus its growing strength In the air prevented 
Germany from gaining the necessary cover it needed to support 
an amphibious landing, Hitler believed that Britain8s will 
to continue the war had been revived, and he attributed the 
revival to that nation's growing hope of an alliance with 
the Soviet Union. General Franz Haider,, the Army's Chief of 
Staff reported that the Fuehrer had said, "With Russia smashed,
Britain8s last hope will be shattered, Russia's destruction
22must be made a part of this struggle," J The attack was 
tentatively scheduled for the spring of 1961.
From the beginning of August a gradual change In Finno- 
German relations was begun. At first, the talks on Petsamo 
continued to highlight the German interest in Finland, but 
military involvement was soon begun. The Petsamo negotiations 
had worn themselves into a predictable routine. The Soviet 
Union continued to press for the concession, and Finland 
continued to stall with a variety of excuses. Germany 
wished to keep the Soviet Union ignorant of its talks with 
Finland and it wanted the Finns to negotiate with the 
Russians In a "dilatory manner," but the Reich was still 
unwilling to give anything but tacit moral support to aid
2^Haider Diaries, IV, l6l, 166,
8?
In the talks.
Bluecher, now that he saw a renewed German interest in 
Finland, began once more to cable reports on the importance 
of Finland to the war effort. He said that the Petsamo con­
cession would give Germany a twenty-year supply of' nickel, 
and he was positive that the Finns were ready to sign a 
favorable agreement with the Reich, He also cautioned that 
a Russian occupation of the Aaiand Islands -would, make 
.•« Germany's military-political position in the North
Pii.untenable. '  Finland had once again been trying; to interest 
Sweden in a bilateral defense of the Aalands, and the Soviet 
Union was opposing the plan, Russia felt that Finland was 
planning to turn whatever fortifications were built over to 
Germany, and it felt that It should be able to take part in 
any scheme to defend the Islands,
Ambassador Bluecher was no longer the only one to call 
for an increased influence in Finland, Marshal Keitel, the 
Chief of Staff of the German -Armed Forces High Command, told 
Weizsaecker that the OKU would regret a new Russo-Finnish war. 
OKW„ in view of the new Soviet troop movement to and from 
Hanko, felt that a word of restraint should be given to 
Russia, reminding it of the German economic interests in 
Finland, Welzsaecker felt that the diplomatic situation 
between Russia and Germany would not permit such a blunt
2^DGFP, x, ^05.
o q u O
proposal. He believed that the only thing that could be
done at the time -would be to make a discreet inquiry to the
2 5USSR to find, out if it., had any "new plans" for Finland,,
The first indication of Germany's military cooperation 
with Finland came on August 12, when Hitler gave his permis­
sion to allow a pre-Winter War arms contract between Denmark 
and Finland to be completed. When Denmark and Norway were 
invaded, large shipments of arms which were intended for 
delivery to Finland had been captured by the Nazis® General
Keitel reported that Hitler was now beginning a program of
of"indirect and inconspicuous encouragement of the Finns."^ 
Hitler had made inquiries about the strength of Finland's 
army, and he felt that the country could not continue to 
resist the Soviet pressures while it was in such a weakened 
state. If Germany gave Finland an indication of future sup­
port,- Finland could be expected to resist the Russian attempts
27to gain Petsamo®
The time was not yet ripe for a large scale German
intervention into Finland, Hitler was still contemplating
28the beginning of Opers.fion Sea Lion in August, -and an overt 
interest in Finland would still be uremature.' The Finns were
2%GFP, X, 460,
26Ibid., 467,
2^Haider Diaries, IV, 157
o q
Ibid., 159*
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anxious to receive any support that the Germans 'might offer.
On August 14, Ambassador Kivimaki asked if Germany would at
least give diplomatic support to Pinland in case of a new
Busso-FInnIsh war. Kivimaki was undoubtedly looking for
more than diplomatic support, but, in any case, the German
poForeign Office refused, to give him an answer. ' Even silence
was encouraging to the Finns after nearly a year of negative
replies to the same query.
The German military was not following the Foreign Office's
30line of cautious correctness.v On August 17, a. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Joseph Veltjens, acting as a special representative 
of Reiehsmarshal Goering, met with Finland’s Marshal Kanner- 
heiiu. In their conversation, Veltjens said that Germany 
would'be willing to supply Finland with certain war materials 
in return for transit rights to northern Norway and an,option 
on the Petsamo nickel concession, Kannerheim said that he 
could not make a decision on what he believed to be a poli­
tical, rather’ than a military matter, and he referred 
Veltjens to President Ryti. Ryti gave his assent to the plan, 
as the presence of even a limited number of German troops
31would help uo curb the omnipresent Soviet demands, Ryti
29DGFP, X, 478-479.
70The German Foreign Office was not informed of Veltjens 
mission to Helsinki for several months,
31Mannerheim, 399» Ryti later claimed that he had not
given Veltjens any approval of the plan, but he did say that 
he was in favor of it.
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announced on the same day, "We Finns are realists. We have 
tried to maintain good relations with Russia, and we hope
q pthat Russia has the same idea."-'- This speech was intended
to assuage the Soviet doubts as to the course of Finlandrs
diplomacy, but the key word in the address was "realists."
If the Finns were indeed realists, they would soon choose to
cooperate with Germany rather than continue to try to appease
the Soviet Union.
The passage of the troops through Finland was to be
explained to the Soviet Union in cautious terms. The route
to Kirkenes through Finland was shorter and more easily
travelled than any existing line of communication through
Norway. The Soviets were to be told that the men who were
to pass through Finland were replacements. It was obvious
that Germany intended to make more use of the transit rights
than this. On August 22, Hitler decided to send two mountain;
divisions to Kirkenes via Finland, many more men than were'
actually needed to garrison the remote province. On August 26,
the Fuehrer announced that Finland was to be su.pported by
German arms and planes. More important yet, he said that
Germany would occupy Petsamo if liussia attacked Finland 
33again,  ̂ The arms shipments were to be disguised so Russia 
would not know that they were German, As Hitler said, "It
q q --'"Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 58“60. 
-^Haider Diaries, IV, 168, 174; and DGPP» X s 512,
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must be brought home to the Russians that the shipments now 
being made to Finland are merely the last of the arms deli­
veries held up by the viar."^
On August 14, Ribbentro'p quizzed the .Russian ambassador 
to Berlin on the "stiffening" of Russo-Finnish relations’, ';
He said that he was curious to know if an understanding on.!. 
the fortification of the Aaland Islands had been made between: 
Finland and Russia. Germany had no intentions of trying to 
participate as a defender of the islands, but it. let Russia 
Know that it wanted to be part of any new convention that
O i*might decide their fate
The final draft of the transit treaty was completed on 
.September 12. Four main points were covered In the treaty:
(1) Germany was allowed to transport troops from Finnish' 
ports on the Baltic to Kirkenes by way of the northern 
Arctic Highway, (2) The Reich was to inform Finland of the 
intended ports of debarkation, the number of vessels, dates 
of arrival, and stages of transportation through the north,
(3) Finland was to be informed of the arrival.of troops at 
least one day in advance, and (4) troops and ordnance were 
to travel separately.-^ The spirit of the agreement can be 
gauged by.the fact that OKW was confident that the Finns .
J^Haider Diaries1, IV, 1 ?9.
-^Hazi-Soviet Relations, 177»
-̂ DC-FP, XI, 148-149; bmd Mannerheim, 400,
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would ignore Article A,-7'
The troop movement was to be presented to the Soviet 
Union as a fait acconrpll. In advance' instructions to Ambas­
sador Schulenburg, Ribbentrop wanted Molotov informed that' 
the English air attacks on Germany necessitated the emplace­
ment of an antiaircraft battalion in northern Norway? since 
the best route lay through Finland, the troops would be 
transported from H&paranda to Kirkenes -beginning September 22.
Molotov was to be told this information on September 21, but
° QHitler later decided against informing the Russians at all,-'*' 
The fact that the Russians were not told of the troop move­
ments is indicative of the fact that Germany realized how 
serious this new departure from the old Nazi-Soviet accord 
really was• Germany undoubtedly believed that there was a 
good chance that Russia would try to stop .the transit. On 
September 23» the Finnish foreign minister did inform the 
British and Soviet ambassadors of the troop movements. The 
Soviet ambassador was quite excited and asked if the Germans 
had presented the Finns with an ultimatum on the matter. He 
was even more alarmed when he was told that they had not.
Molotov had no intention of receiving the explanation of
3?d g f p 8 x i , 149.
o Q
Ivazi-Soviet Relations „ 188-189* The troop movement was
to begin on the day that the treaty.x^as formally signed.-
9
the troop movement at face value. He demanded that
Schulenburg give him the text of the treaty, including any
secret portions that accompanied it. He also wanted to be
informed in advance of the dates of departure and size of
40any future troop movements, Ribbentrop answered this
request for further information with a communique that simply
reiterated the text of the transit treaty which the Soviet -
Li 1Union had already received from Finland. Molotov was not 
at all pleased with the Beich's effusive answer. He imme­
diately informed Ribbentrop that the Non-Aggression Pact had 
placed Finland within the Soviet sphere of influence and that 
he considered the latest German move as a breach of the
hotreaty. Russia, attempted to meet the Nazi .threat by' 
demanding that Finland grant'Russian representatives unre­
stricted travel rights within their consular territories 
If Russia could not stop the movements or gain' information on 
them from Germany, it could assess the situation by itself.
By October 19, 4,800 men, 58? vehicles, and an anti-
iilj-'aircraft battalion had been transported to Kirkenes.' As 
the German military presence in Finland began to increase,
^°DGFP, XI, 195-196; and Nazi-Soviet Relations, 197-199 
^Ibid,, 236-238? 201-203.
^2Ibid-., 244-245; .203-204.
ho4P inland Reveals Her Secret Documents', 64.
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the Reich started to become more involved in the diplomatic 
disputes between Finland and Russia on the Aaland and Petsamo 
questions. Previously,, only Sweden had been an interested 
ally in the defense of the islands. Now, Finland was trying 
to involve Germany in the scheme. Germany, however, was only 
interested in trying to exclude the Soviet Union from, any 
new defense plans. To the German Foreign Office, only a- 
unilateral Finnish fortification or a total demilitarization 
of. the islands would serve as an acceptable solution to the 
problem, Finland continued to stall, on the Soviet request 
to participate in the defense plans by saying that the 1921 
Aaland Convention signators would have to give their approval 
before any new plan would be legal, Molotov appeared doubtful 
of this explanation, and he sarcastically asked if Poland’s 
approval was being sought. His disgust at the constant 
Finnish delays in the pending agreements prompted him to say:
"With the Germans one /meaning the Plnns7 can settle even
!< <  ■big matters in a few days." When the Finns realized that
the Russians could be delayed no longer, they negotiated a 
demilitarization agreement with them on October 11. By this 
agreement, Finland promised to demilitarize the islands and 
not allow them to be placed at the disposal of any other 
power. The Soviet Union gained the right to maintain
^ DGFP, XI, 35~3o,
Zj, A s / \.Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, o3-ovi
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consular offices on the main islands to observe the demili-
hnt&rization and see that no new fortifications mere built, 1
This settlement seemed more desirable to the Finns than a
military cooperation with the Soviets, -but Finland was still
very interested in trying to get the Germans involved, in the
islands. Shortly after the agreement with Bussia had been
signed, President Byti and Marshal Mannerheim told Lieutenant-
Colonel Veltjens that they hoped Germany would settle the
Aaland dispute by occupying the islands. If an occupation
would not be feasible at that time, Finland would cooperate
with the Germans whenever they thought that an Invasion would 
kgoe convenient.
The Petsamo negotiations continued to produce nothing 
but the same obstinate impasse. The Soviets seemed more 
anxious to gain the concessions now that German troops were 
in the area, but they were also forced to modify their de­
mands for the same reason. Molotov informed Ambassador 
paasikivi on September 1^ that the Soviet Union wanted the 
Petsamo concession or the Institution of a joint Busso-Finnish 
com.p8.ny to direct the production "of the ore, Paasikivi tried 
to explain the difficulty of arranging either of the two 
proposalsa First of all, it was still felt that it would.not 
be legal to revoke the Mond Company's concession. Secondly,
'Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 65-67•
48DGFP, XI, 361.
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since Finland had already refused the German request for the 
concession for the same reason, it would now be very diffi­
cult to reverse the decision in favor of the Soviet Union, ^
In mid-September, the Finns once again asked the German 
Foreign Office about Its interest in Petsamo, Weizsaecker 
told Paasikivi that Germany had given up the idea of trying 
to obtain the concession, but it was still interested in
toseeing that the Russians did not get a, foothold in the area.-' 
On October 8r Ribbentrop indicated that it would try to give 
Finland more support, Russia had continued its Impatient 
demands for a settlement on Petsamo, and Germany felt that 
the Finns5 will to resist had to be bolstered once again.
Arms were sent to Finland, but Germany still wished to main­
tain peace in the Baltic, Finland was advised to•continue 
the "dilatory negotiations" as long as it.could.'
In late October and early November, the Petsamo talks, 
were reaching a point of crisis. Paasikivi was again asked 
why a settlement had not been reached, Molotov claimed that 
he had received permission from the British to transfer the' 
concession to the1 Soviet Union.'"* tie said that if Finland
1'yFinland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 61-62,
5°DGFPi XI, 105,
51Ibld,, 270-271, 328, 397-398.
'“Britain had said that if uhe concession were trans- 
fered it would like to see Russia receive it if they promised 
to ship no ore to Germany,
97
did not deliver a definite answer on the question in two or 
three days, " ,., the USSR would be compelled to take mea­
sures which the situation demanded. " The Finns still did 
not promise to agree to the proposal despite the Soviet 
threat» The tensions between Russia and Finland continued 
until Molotov went to Berlin in November for conferences 
with Hitler and Ribbentrop,
For several months the German Foreign Office had been 
trying to get 'Molotov to come to Berlin for talks. The1 
Soviet Foreign Commissar traveled little, but 'since Ribbentrop 
had been to Moscow on several occasions it was felt that he 
should reciprocate the visits, Although the talks of November 
12 and 13 covered a wide variety of topics, they did display 
the underlying currents of tension that existed between -the 
two powers on the subject of Finland. The growing Nazi . 
influence in Finland seemed to dominate Molotov's remarks 
from the beginning of the talks. In a review of the success 
of.the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Molotov said that 
every article had been fulfilled except for Finland. Molotov 
believed that, while he had no criticism of the German atti­
tude during the Winter War, Germany was not respecting the 
proposed Russian sphere of influence In Finland, Hitler 
replied, that he had no political interest In Finland, but he 
was interested In resuming economic relations and maintaining
ti V-^Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 73-
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the transit agreement to facilitate the troop movement to 
northern - Norway, As to the recent Soviet pressures on 
Finland, the Fuehrer told Molotov that Germany could not­
allow a new war to develop in the Baltic. The world's senti­
ment was with Finland, and the war would cause severe hard­
ships on the Belch's war effort. Molotov complained that 
the German troops in Finland caused the Finns to be intran­
sigent. in their relations.with the Soviet Union. The troops, 
Hitler said, were not permanently stationed there and they 
would be removed in the near future. In .the' meantime, Germany
would have to leave them there in order; to. - help move troops.
' ' 'T ’ 59to Norway.-'
Although very little was decided'at the meetings, the, 
talks have to be considered as a diplomatic victory for the 
Germans. Russia, had tried to eliminate the German presence 
In its sphere, of influence, but Hitler asserted that the . 
status quo would have to be maintained due to.the situation 
of the war. Molotov m s  quite adamant and even a little 
menacing when he spoke of Finland, He said, that the Reich's 
diplomacy was ambiguous, and he asserted that Nazi-Soviet 
relations could be cleared up only If an understanding were 
reached on Finland. Since no understanding was- reached, 
it was an Indication that Finland had finally begun to 
supercede Germany's interest in maintaining friendly relations
■^Nazi-Soviet Relations, 239— 290,
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with the USSR,
The Soviet Union continued to try to force Germany to
limit its influence in Finland after the talks had ended.
On November 26, Molotov Informed the German Foreign Office
that Russia would join the Axis Powers in the recently pro-
posed. Four Power Pact-30 if, among other things, Germany
withdrew its troops from Finland and negotiated a new secret
<■7protocol on the area. ' The Reich Ignored the Soviet request,
COalthough Russia continued, to ask for a reply.-30
Despite the Soviet concern over Finland, Reichsmarshal' 
Goering decided to send Lieutenant-Colonel Veltjens to Helsink 
to continue military talks on November 25. Finnish military 
strength was to be assessed and. the Finns were to be giver- a 
review of the talks with Molotov. They were told that the. 
final decision on the Petsamo question was up.to them, but 
they need not worry about any future tensions,59 <rile Reich 
had not yet promised to aid Finland In a, war with Russia, but 
the Finns were led to believe that Its assistance was inevi­
table . When Veltjens returned to Berlin, he reported that
r' (f
•̂̂ NazI-Soviet Relations, 240-247.
 ̂fS ̂A Three Power Pact had been signed by Germany, Italy, 
and Japan on September 27, 1940.
f Nazi-Soviet Relations , 2>b-2p9 »
■58Ibid., 270-271.
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Finland was badly in need of planes and it had requested two
oor.'three, batteries of heavy artillery. General Ealaer,
upon reading the report, wanted to know .how long it would
take to make "quiet preparations" for an offensive from
61Finland to the southeast of Lake Ladoga,
The Finnish election in December became another item of
■contention in the growing Russian-Finnish-German political
trianglea In November, President Kallio had announced his
62•resignation because of ill health, and new elections were
6l -scheduled, for December 19. J The Finns had sought German
advice on the elections as early as the November visit of
Veitjens. At the tine, VeitJens was only able to say that
he thought the election of Marshal Mannerheim might be
6 h." . .tantamount to a declaration of war on Russia,” ‘ Later,
on December 2, Bluecher said that Germany could easily 
influence the course of the elections because the Finnish
Electoral College felt that the new president would have to 
be persona grata, in B e r l i n . Eibbentrop replied to Bluecher
OGFP, XI, Sip. 
°^Halder Diaries, V, r/l,
°~Since Kallio died very shortly after his resignation, 
there Is no reason to believe that either the Russians or 
Germans tried to pressure him into quitting his post,
63Upton? 190-191.
6ijT)GPP, XI, 813.
6^Ibid., 763.
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that the German Government did not care to comment on the
presidential candidates, but he did feel that the Finns
should evaluate the effect that Mannerheim* s election would
66have on Finland's relations with Russia. Russia seemed 
-much more concerned with the elections than was Germany.
Gn December 7, Molotov informed Ambassador Paasikivi that If 
Mannerheim, Xivimaki, or Svinhufvud were elected, the Soviet 
Union would be forced to conclude that Finland, no longer 
cared to observe the recent peace treaty.^? The Soviet objec­
tions to Kivimaki, the Finnish ambassador to Germany, and 
Svinhufvud. the father of past Finno-German collaboration, 
were obvious. Mannerheim was singled put as unacceptable 
because of his strong hatred of communism and the increased 
emphasis on military preparations that he would undoubtedly 
begin once he was elected. Prime Minister Risto Eyti, who 
had already been assuming the presidential duties during 
Kallio9s ill health, was finally elected as a compromise 
candidate. A search for national unity found that Ryti was 
the only candidate who would be acceptable to both the poli­
tical right and left in Finland and also be persona grata, in
6RBerlin and Moscow.
DGFP, XI, -799-800.‘ Mannerheim was not interested in 
politics, and he was not seeking the presidency. However, 
he could have had the office simply by asking for it.
^Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, • 82-83. DGFP, XI,
841.
b8Upton, 191-195.
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The military commitments between Germany and Finland 
in early December were still very limited. The transit 
agreement had placed over one thousand German troops on . 
Finnish soils, and .Veit jens ! visit to Helsinki laid a basis 
for future planningj but, as yet, Germany!s •intentions of 
using Finland as part of its plan to invade Russia were still 
very nebulous. The military accord between the two countries 
began to take a much more definite shape when, on December 18, 
Hitler released his war Directive #21. This directive 
spelled out the preliminary plans for Operation Barbarossa, 
the code name for the invasion of Russia. Listed under the 
heading of "Probable Allies" the directive stated:
Rumania's and Finland's active parti­
cipation in the war against Soviet Russia 
is to be anticipated; they will provide con­
tingents on either wing of our ground forces-.,:. •
In due course the Armed- Forces High t ,
Command will approach these two countries 
and make. arrangements as to the manner in 
which their military contingents will be 
placed under German command at the time of 
their intervention.
Finland will cover the concentration 
of the Gerraan Force North which will be 
transferred from Norway, and the Finnish 
troops will operate in conjunction with this 
force, Moreover,/Finland will have to 
neutralize Hanko.^9
The plan went on to state that Army Group XXI' would protect
Norway, secure the Petsamo area, and advance with the Finnish
troops against the Murmansk Railroad, Operation Barbarossa’s
^ Nazi-Soviet Relations, 260-26^-.
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tactical plans 'were far from complete, but the basis of 
Finland’s cooperation in the campaign had been established.
Hitler, in his assessment of the importance- of Finland, 
felt that with Finnish support Leningrad could-be encircled 
and Russia would then be cut off from'the Baltic.?^ Troop 
movements for the invasion had already gotten underway. By 
the and of December of 19^0, there were one and a half moun­
tain divisions, an infantry division, and an SS brigade 
waiting to move from Norway into Petsamo and the Bybatchiy 
Peninsula.?1 Now, it was only necessary to complete the plan 
of attack and coordinate it with the Finnish General -Staff.
The final plans for the attack from Finland were well 
begun. In August, the plans for the attack on Petsamo had 
been drawn up under the code name of Operation Benntler.?2 
On January 16, 1940, General von Falkenhorst,73 the Commander 
of the German army in Norway, was ordered to complete the 
necessary plans for an attack on Russia from the Lake Onega- 
Lake Ladoga area. He completed the plans on January 27* and 
they'became known by the cover name of Silberfuchs. This
39*70'halter warlimont, Inside Hitler6s Headquarters, 193 
lg46. trans. by R, E. Barry (New Yorks Frederick A. Praeger 
.19&TT. 138 a
71thladder Diaries. IV, 09. '
?2Ziemke, 121
73,,-’General von Faulkenhorst was also with the German 
forces in Finland in 191-8.
attack envisioned the use of Finnish troops in a mass attack 
east of Lake 'Ladoga and then south toward the Svir Fiver.
Finland would he asked to provide for the security of its 
southern coast and the Aaland Islands„'while the German attack 
would be directed further north from Salla to the White Sea 
In order to join up with the forces of Operation Benntier 
and trap the Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula.^
On January 27 < Marshal Mannerheim received an invitation 
to send one of his staff officers to Berlin, to lecture on 
the Winter War. Mannerheim sent his Chief of Staff, General 
Heinrichs; and since he had reason to believe that the 
German® s were going to use this meeting as an excuse to 
inquire about Finland®s military strategies, he Instructed 
Heinrichs to try to find out all he could about German war 
plans In the ..North. In Berlin, Heinrichs met with General 
Haider and General Paulus, the chief planner of Operation 
Barbarossa. Haider did reveal some of the plans concerning 
Operation Silberfuchsf and General Heinrichs, although Man­
nerheim had instructed.him not to commit Finland to any 
plans, told the German General Staff officers about Finnish 
Ideas on mobilization and deposition of troops in case of a 
war with the USSR. The information that was received from 
Heinrichs was almost enough to complete the final preparations
” 'Ziemke , 125; and Haider Diaries, V, 115-116.
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for the northern attackJ rj
Flnno-Gsrman collaboration continued on February 19 
when Colonel Euschenhagen, the Chief of Staff for German' 
Forces in Norway, met with General Heinrichs and Colonel 
Tapoeia, the Finnish Chief of Operations. The conference 
revolved about the operations from central and northern 
Finland, especially the Petsamo area. After the preliminary 
conferences were over, Euschenhagen traveled north with 
Tapoeia to inspect the area around Rovanjemi, Petsamo, 
Urinsalmo, and Kuusamo, As a result of these tours, the 
German High Command in Norway was able to work out an exten­
sion of Operation'Sllberfuchs, which was to be known as 
Operation P1a11nfuchs.10
At the talks in Helsinki, the Finns expressed little 
interest in participating in the attack from Petsamo. The 
area had great economic importance, but it had little senti­
mental value to them. Finland felt that arr attack on the
north should be the responsibility of the .Germans, The Finns
/
greatest concern seemed to be the reconquest of the areas 
lost to the Soviet Union in the Winter War, Finland spoke 
only of its local interests, and Euschenhagen had been 
cautious in'his comments, saying that the plans should still
?5Ziemke, 124-126.
761 International Military Tribunal, Trials of War Criminals 
before the Nuremburg Military Tribunals, VII (Washingtons 
U.S. Government Printing Office, I9T7T 9 310■ Hereafter cited 
as Nuremburg Tribunals; and DGFP, XII, 122-123.
ry mbe thought of as theoretical.‘(
Russo-German relations continued to deteriorate until,
by I'larch 27» Ribbentrop was able to tell Japan1’ s Foreign
Minister Matsuoka that diplomacy with Russia was "correct
but deteriorating. If Russia makes a false move she will
be'crushed." He added that the conditions in the Baltic
countries that Russia had occupied were ".terrible," and •
Germany was on its guard against further Soviet moves in'
the area,?® In a later continuation of the talks Ribbentrop’
stated that German resistance to the Soviet Union with
respect to Finland was based on economics and sentiment.
Germanys according to the Foreign Minister, could never
allow Finland to fall to Russia.?^
The German Government also displayed a desire to see
Sweden become involved In the Northern war plans. The Reich
did not expect Sweden to enter the war, but it felt that
Sweden might aid by supplying transit rights to German troops
moving from southern Norway to Finland. Sweden had already
given limited transit rights to the German array shortly
P 0after the fall of Norway, and It was now felt that the 
schedule of attack for Operation Silberfuchs could be
??DGFP, XII. 124-126
78Nazi-Soviet Relations, 281-288, passim.
?9lbid., 303-311, passim,
1C?
maintained only if Sweden agreed to grant passage, Germany 
thought that the Swedes might .grant the necessary coopera­
tion if they ’wished to help Finland in a new war with the 
Soviet Union, Swedo-Finnish ties had been close during the 
year following the Winter War, There had been plans of a 
political union between the two countries, but this had been 
discouraged by both the Germans and the Russians, Still, 
Sweden did continue to give indications that it would give 
support to Finland if it were attacked again.
After inquiries were ms.de by the German Foreign Office, 
it was learned that Sweden would aid Finland only if Russia 
were the aggressor. It would not lend support if Finland 
attacked first, nor would it assist if Finland joined the 
war on the side of the Axis Powers» However, Germany still 
hoped to find a way to make Sweden permit' German forces to 
cross its borders.
The final preparations for the German-Finnish military 
■cooperation were made in May, General Jodi, on May 12, told 
the Foreign Office that it had become urgent to enter into 
detailed discussions with Finland on matters pertaining to 
troop transportation, joint operations, and the composition 
of the high command, for the Finnish Theater, The German 
attack-on Yugoslavia and Greece had increased the tensions 
between Russia and. Germany* This, plus the' continued delay
8idgfp, 633/ 620-621,
J.08
of the invasion of Great Britain, made the implementation
of Operation Barbarossa more and more a reality. The QKW
ranted the proposals for the conferences to be made by the
Foreign Off.ice, because the army still wanted Finland to
think that .Operation Barbarossa was a theoretical plan and
8 ?not a matter of immediate concerns ~
Earl Schnurre left for Helsinki on May 20 in order to 
inform the Firms of the talks. Hitler had told, him to tell 
President Eyti that the relations between Germany and the 
Soviet Union were strained, but there was not yet a need to 
declare war. However, all eventualities still had to be pre­
pared for, and Finland was requested to send officers to 
Berlin so that they could be informed of "the alarming world 
situation."' President Ryti told Schnurre that Finland did 
not desire to be drawn into the war between the great powers, 
but it would fight if the Soviet Union attacked. To the 
question of whether Germany would consider a Russian attack 
on Finland a casus belli, Schnurre answered yes. Shortly 
after the conversation, the Finnish cabinet voiced its .
unanimous consent to send military representatives to the
83meetings in Berlin and' Salzburg.
Finland again chose to send General Heinrichs,
82DGFP, XII, ?8?,
u-%lannerheim, t06j and DGFP, XII, ii-06-40?. The Finnish 
Diet was not informed of the talks. Only a. very few Finnish 
officials knew the extent of the military preparations. ...
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accompanied by Colonel Tapoeia, to Germany. The briefing
on Operation Barbarossa was conducted by General Jodi and
Colonel Euschenhagen. At the meetings the German Staff was
careful not to inform the Finns of the part that Army Groups
Central and South mould play in the campaign in Hussia,
Tiiejr were only told of the plans for Finland and given a'.
general indication as to how this operation would corap lament.
the movements of Army Group North. The Germans were not
suspicious of Finland but they did wish to maintain the
84highest degree of seerecjn
After a short explanation of the worsening of Busso- 
G-erman relations, Heinrichs and Tapoeia were told that the 
High Command expected the Russians to collapse most quickly 
in the Baltic. The German arms'- proposed to drive through 
■the Baltic States to Leningrad while the navy closed the 
eastern end of the Baltic Sea. The chain of command that 
was proposed for the Finnish -Theater would place Finland*s 
army in the northern and central areas under General von 
Faulkenhorst. The German and Finnish troops in the Lake 
Ladoga front would be directed by Marshal Mannerheim. The 
plans for Operations Benntier, Sllfcerfuchs, and Platlnfuchs 
were then introduced to the Finnish officers
After the plans were explained, General Heinrichs agreed
84DCFP, XII, 879-880,
8^lbid., 880-882
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to the proposals on the formation of the high command, and 
'the request for Finnish scouts and reconnaissance teams to 
support Operation Renntier in the north, but he sought modi- 
. f deration on other points . The Germans wanted Finland to 
support the attack in the center on Kandalaksha from Sails, 
with one division as far as the border. General Heinrichs 
felt that this would detract from the Finnish effort on the 
Ladoga front. On the subject of Hanko, the Finns were to 
seal off the port and wait for air, armored, and artillery 
support, which would arrive in two or three weeks after the 
main assaults in the north and east. Again the Finns felt 
that the two to three divisions which would be required to 
complete the movement would be batter used in the southeast. 
The Germans said that.it might be impossible for them to 
participate in a campaign- against the port, as the assault 
troops would have to be brought to that point through -Sweden 
if they were to arrive at the beginning of the campaign * The 
last combat area that was discussed was the Aaland Islands, 
Here, General Heinrichs believed that the Germans should 
occupy the Islands before the main attack began. This way, 
Finland could begin Its mobilization without seeming to be 
directing its forces at Russia, The German High Command, of 
course, was against any early occupation because it would 
destroy the element of surprise for the main attack. Other 
items that were discussed concerned transportation, mobili­
zation, arid the use of Finnish air fields by the Germans.
Ill
The German units were to begin to arrive in Finland between 
June 10 and 15. ‘The Finns said that it would take them nine 
days to mobilise, and they would not set a date for the 
mobilization yet because they wanted to wait upon "develop­
ments ." The Finns had two major concerns about mobilization. 
They were afraid that after they had begun to mobilize, 
which would be an act of war in .the eyes of the Soviet Union, 
Germany might decide to cancel its plans, leaving Finland 
to face the Russians alone* Secondly, Finland wanted the 
world and even its own citizens to think that the USSR was 
the aggressor. It wanted to make secret preparations for 
the war and then enter the conflict only after the Soviet 
Union had violated Finnish territory. On May 28, General 
Keitel said that further talks would settle the few remaining
differences of opinion, and the Foreign Office would continue
86to press Sweden for the necessary transit rights.
Sweden was being asked to allow German troops to pass 
through on Swedish trains and roads* The Swedes were also 
being asked to allow the Germans and Finns to purchase as•
O rymany motor vehicles as possible .c • Sweden had earlier said 
that it might allow troops to pass through Swedish terri­
torial waters, but it indicated that a passage by rail would
°°DGPP, XII, 882-8851 Mannerheim, 40?-408 j and Ziemke 
132-135.
87dgFP, XI. 104-0-1012
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p Qnot be permitted. Sweden, did give in to German pressure 
and allow one division to pass, but the permission was given 
four days after the attack had begun.
The final talks were resumed in Helsinki on June 23. 
Colonel Buschenhagen later reported that Finland was now 
prepared to launch its attack in the south on either the 
eastern or western side of Lake Ladoga with five days' notice. 
The Finns proposed to use five divisions in the attack, but 
they were not confident that they would be able to reach the 
Svir River. They also agreed to occupy the Aalands and seal 
off Hank.0, but they insisted that the assault on Kanko be 
led by a German d i v i s i o n . i n  addition, Finland required 
that Germany guarantee its continued independence and former 
territorial borders. General mobilization was to begin on 
June ly»/-
On the morning of June 22, Germany, invaded the Soviet 
Union through the plains of Poland, Russia had been getting 
reports of the German troop concentrations on its borders, 
but it did little to prepare for the attack. Hours after 
the invasion had begun* Hitler read an address to the German 
people, informing them of the reasons for the new turn in
88DG?P, XI, 322, 
^Ziemke, 139» 
9°Ibid,, 13k,
91dgfp, xii, 963.
the war. Included in the . speech was a paragraph on Finland 
which stated:
In alliance with their Finnish com­
rades, the victors of Narvik stand on the 
shore of the Arctic Ocean. German divi­
sions, led by the conqueror of Norway, 
along with Finnish liberation fighters undeg 
their Marshal, protect Finland's territory.
The Finns, though they had not yet declared war, were 
now allies in name and fact with the Third Reich. The Soviet 
Union, although confused by the German attack, did not wait 
long to strike at Finland. On the morning of the 22nd, 
several Russian batteries opened fire into Finnish territory, 
and Helsinki was bombed a little later.^  Finland did not 
retaliate, as it wanted It to be very evident that the Soviet 
union was the aggressor. Finally, on June 25, Finland 
decided to take "defense" measures, and for the Finns the 
Winter War had become the Continuation War.
9^Upton, 282. 
^Mannerheim, 512.
CHAPTER IV
THE COLLABORATION
One week after Hitler's address which announced the 
Nazi-Finnish collaboration in the war against Bussia,
Marshal Mannerheim made his own call to arms.to the Finnish 
people»
I summon you to a Holy War against 
the enemy of our people, From graves 
covered with summer green our fallen heroes 
rise at this moment to join us anew, as, 
in conjunction with the great war power of 
Germany and as its companion in arms, we 
march out to a crusade against our enemy, 
in order to create a secure future for 
Finland,
Brothers in arms! Follow me once 
more, for the last time, now when Karelia
rises and the dawn of a new day for Finland
gleams before us * 1
News of the G-erman attack on the Soviet Union brought 
no great joy to the Finnish people. The memories of the 
bitter suffering during the Winter war were still fresh in 
their memories, and even though the collaboration with the
Nazis had been kept from the people, even the most politi­
cally innocent knew that Russia would soon spread 'the war 
into Finland,‘ For almost three years': the Soviet leaders had 
told the Finns that Russia would never wait for a German
“'Lund in, 12?,
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attack to develop from the north. The- Husslan positions 
along the Finnish border had been strengthened since the 
Winter War, and now, since Hitler's statement on the Finnish- 
German alliance in arms, the Soviet course of action could 
be predicted with ease. Marshal Mannerheim"s address was 
far from unanimously accepted by' either the average Finnish 
citizen' or by the leaders of state,. Finland had, in the 
past, been considered as one of the buffer zones between 
Christlam Europe and the "Barbaric Hordes" to the east, so 
the call to a "Holy War" may have attracted some. However, 
the rest of the speech was a flagrant overstatement of Finnish 
war aims, Finland did hope to eliminate the threat of Soviet 
belligerence, but the irredentist spirit to claim Soviet 
■Karelia, a land that had not been included in Finnish borders 
for over five-hundred years, was almost completely absent,
For most Finns, the war was lust a painful necessity, forced 
upon them by a system of international power politics over 
which they had no control* Finland was not pro-Nazi, nor 
was it even ardently pro-German. There were cultural and 
religious ties with Germany which could not be discounted, 
but Finland's post-World War I years had been spent trying 
to develop new cultural, political, and economic alliances 
with Sweden and Great Britain, not Germany, The Finns, with 
’the exception of a very few pro-Nazis, looked upon the asso­
ciation with Germany as an alliance forced upon them by the 
everpresent threat of Soviet domination and the political
Isolation caused by the German conquests in the West, Fin­
land wanted, the world to believe that Germany was a "cobel­
ligerent" in the Continuation War. It, however, did not want 
the Allies to believe that Finland was a permanent German 
ally In the wider European war. From the past experience of 
the Winter War, the Finns realized that Germany was- using 
Finland as a pawn in it's attempt to establish the Thousand 
Year Reich, If at all possible, Finland would now like to
use Germany as expediently as possible in the Continuation
’■ 2war,
The German campaign began on June 22 with the execution" 
of Operation Remitler into Petsamo.by the 27,500 men of Moun­
tain Corps Norway; The territory between Finnmark and the- 
eastern Russo-Finnish border was covered in two days. On 
June 22, the command of the Army of Norway ordered that the 
attack on northern Russia should begin on June 29. The German 
operations in Finland north of the Karelian front were 
divided Into two sectors. The code name for the entire opera­
tion was SIlberfuchs» The attack in the far north was called 
Flatinfuchs while the campaign on the mideastern Russo-Finnish 
border was named Polarfuchs, platInfuchs was to secure the 
Petsamo nickel fields, seal off and. capture the Rybatchiy 
Peninsula, and move east to Murmansk. Polarfuchs was to 
feature an attack from central Finland near Salla northeastward
2Lundin, Chapter VII, "Finnish Mar Alms and the Karelian 
Cuestion, "• 113-144, pa.ssim,
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to the city of Kandalaksha on the Murmansk Railroad, Hitler 
hoped that the control of the Russian north would produce 
psychological as well as military'victories. If Murmansk 
and the railroad leading south to Leningrad were captured, 
Russia would be cut off from any possible British support.
The main German attacks on Russia were' directed at Leningrad, 
Moscow, and Stalingrad, Operation Sllberfuchs was decidedly 
a secondary effort, secondary even to the Finno-German cam­
paign in southern Karelia; but it did hope to secure the 
northern Arctic shores which Hitler believed were vulnerable
Oto a British attack
Several factors In Operation Platlnfuchs5 plan of attack 
caused great concern in the German High Command, Hitler had ' 
Insisted that seven divisions of the Army of Norway remain 
In northern Norway to guard against 8, British invasion.
This decision severely lessened the number of assault troops 
that were needed to insure a rapid victory before the winter 
set in. Secondly* the supplies for the forces in northern 
Finland were to be brought overland from Narvik on a road 
that lacked an all-weather surface. Next, the terrain and 
climate of northern Finland and Russia were not at all advan­
tageous to the German Blitzkreig. There were very few roads 
In the area, and the topography was better suited for the 
Soviet defensive positions that it was for the German assau.lt
^Ziemke, l60~l65; and Lundin, 151-153.
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wuxua. Although it was now summer, the mild weather could 
be expected to last for only one more month. Then the
Lir a m  s would turn the few existing roads into mud."* 
Platlnfuchs was directed by General Dietel, and his 
early objectives, though limited, proved to be too ambitious 
under the existing circumstances. The original assault was
to seal off the Rybatchiy Peninsula and Kola Bay and then.,
\
if time and weather permitted, Murmansk was to be taken.
The attack was launched on schedule toward the initial objec­
tive, the Litsa Elver south of the Rybatchiy Peninsula, but 
the advance was slowed by the terrain and the strong Soviet 
resistance. The Germans had expected to meet Russian reserve 
units -in -that area, but they were surprised, to find two crack 
Soviet divisions between .the Litsa River and the Finnish 
border. The Rybatchiy Peninsula was sealed off on July 
but the Germans did not have enough troops to move north to 
capture it. The attack on Litsa was nearly a complete failure 
The Germans reached, the river, but they were soon driven back. 
General Dietel asked Hitler to release additional troops from 
Norway, but the Fuehrer believed that they were needed where 
they were, By the middle of September, the autumn rains 
began. The Army Corps of Norway then began to prepare its 
winter, line, of defense west of the Litsa. Platlnfuchs had 
■produced an early stalemate, a stalemate that was to last
‘LZiemke, l6?~i68.
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until the summer of 19^4. ̂
Operation Polarfuchs, under the direction of General 
von Falhenhdrsts moved east from the Salla railroad toward 
Kandalaksha on July 1. In this attack there was almost an 
even number of both Gorman and Finnish troops * 'The German 
XXXVT Corps, consisting of two divisions had been joined by 
the Finnish 3rd and 6th Divisions, The Germans and Finns 
were not integrated into a single unit and they had different 
objectives, but they were both under the same German command, 
Polarfuchs turned into a repetition of Platinfuchs: early 
advances were met by exceedingly stiff Soviet resistance.
The Russians had obviously prepared well for the German 
attack in the north, ana as long as they had the Murmansk 
Railroad they would have little difficulty bringing in sup­
plies and replacements, .The initial German drive was broken 
off on July 8'when the Russians launched a strong counter­
offensive, For the rest.of the summer there were offensives 
and counteroffensives of a very minor nature, and this
6sector also went into winter positions hopelessly stalemated..
Although Operation Sllberfuchs did not produce the 
results that had been expected, the war on the Ladoga-Karelia 
front was much more encouraging to the Germans, Here, the 
Finns were more willing raptieluants, and the drive of Army
•%ieinke» l69~l?23 
^Mannerheim, ^21-922,
»i /-V..L it U
Group North across the Baltic States toward Leningrad had 
forced the Russians to withdraw troops from this area. The 
Germans wanted the Finns to develop two lines of attack in 
this sector. One of then was to proceed due.south down the 
Karelian Isthmus , and the other was to sweep .around the 
northeast coast of Lake Ladoga to the Svir Biver and then 
continue southwest until it linked up with Army Group North 
to encircle Leningrad. The Germans had high hopes for 
Finnish success against the Russians, The Finnish array had 
been restocked, with German arms, and It now had the artillery* 
mortars, and antitank weapons that it had lacked in the 
Winter War, In addition, the 500,000 men who had been mobi- 
lized, nearly sixteen per cent of Finland's total population, 
would be fighting against its age-old enemy In an attempt to 
recover the portions of the homeland which had. been lost in 
194-0,?
The Finnish offensive began on July 10 with the Army of 
Karelia, under the command of General Heinrichs, making a 
thrust on either side of Lake Yanis, located a few miles 
north of Lake Ladoga, The attack was being directed, by 
Marshal Mannerheim, and the troops employed in the operation 
were almost exclusively Finnish. Only the German 163rd 
Infantry Division, which had originally been intended for 
Operation Polarfuchs, was In the area, and it was to be used
Dianne rhein, 4-16-^18
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in reserve. As expected, the Russians had, been forced to 
.remove their reserves from the Ladoga-Karelia front in order 
to bolster Leningrad’s western defenses. When the offensive 
began, the Finns had a clear three to one numerical superi-
Ooritjr over the Soviet troops.
From July 10 through the middle of August, the attack 
went exactly as it had been planned. The Finnish VI Corps 
attacked from the northeast of Lake Yanis toward Lake Ladoga, 
In six days it had covered sixty-five miles. Upon reaching 
Lake.'Ladoga, the offensive split into two branches: one. down 
the eastern shore of the Lake and the other east in the 
direction of Lake Onega. By August 16, the Finnish forces 
had crossed the 1939 Russo-Finnish borders and controlled 
half of the isthmus between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega.9
The military cooperation between the Germans and the 
Finns began to display serious differences of opinion in 
mid-August. Field Marshal Von Leeb’s Army Group North still 
planned to complete the encirclement of Leningrad by joining 
the Finns onthe Svir. , On August "2, QKH had asked Mannerheim 
to ..plan a continuation of the attack that was now progressing 
along the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga until it reached the 
Svir River, Mannerheim refused to comply, but he did agree 
to push south along the Kare'lian Isthmus. Mannerheim‘s
®Ziemke, 188-190,
9Ibld., 191-192.
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refusal to continue the attach to the'Svir was based on two 
.considerations. The German offensive which was aimed at 
Leningrad had slowed considerably once it had entered Russia 
proper from the Baltic States. Mannerheim was reluctant to 
extend his troops south into Russia until he had some posi­
tive assurance that the Nazi forces could reach their goals. 
Secondly, Mannerheim was personally interested only in re­
gaining Finnish territory on the Karelian Isthmus and 
extending Finland's border east into Soviet Karelia, where 
the local population was expected to greet the Finns as 
liberators, A thrust into the Russian plains meant an esca­
lation of the war that would extend Finland’s already inade- 
10quate army.
On August 13, Mannerheim ordered, his II Corps, I'jhich to
this time had made only a short drive to the northwest corner
of Lake Ladoga, to turn south into the Karelian Isthmus, In
just a few days, the Finnish forces established a bridgehead
In the middle of the Isthmus, To complement II Corps8
attack, IV Corps launched an offensive down the western side
of the Isthmus toward Viipuri. After cutting the Viipuri-
Leningrad rail line and encircling the city, the Finns pushed
on to the Pre-Winter War border and arrived there on 
1 1September 2»"x
-̂ Ziemke, 193~19̂ »
11'Wilhelm Keitel, Memoirs, ed, by Walter Gorlit'z and trains, 
by David Irving (New York: Stein and Day, 1966), 1^8-1^9.
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As the Finns moved ahead, German-Finnish cooperation 
again came into question. Hitler had '-originally believed that 
the capture of Leningrad was a prime military objective. The 
occupation of the second city of the USSR would produce a 
great psychological victory for the Germans as well as give 
them exclusive control of the Baltic Sea. Now Hitler's atten­
tion had turned to the south of Russia. Here were the wheat 
fields of the Ukraine and the oil of Bessarabia, If this 
area could be conquered first,.the Reich could divert these 
materials to Germany in order to alleviate some of the 
growing shortages at home. Part of Army Group North was 
diverted to the south and the encirclement, rather than the 
capture, of the city was planned. Since most of Leningrad's 
food supplies came frora the south, it was felt that a seige 
would not only bring about the ultimate defeat of the city, 
but it would also drastically reduce, the size of the city's 
population, making it much easier to occupy. However, for 
the, encirclement to be completed, it was felt that Finnish 
forces would have to move to the Svir and then continue to 
move on until they linked up with Army Group North, hoepfully 
at Tikhvin.12
The call to launch a new offensive into Russia past the 
defensive positions which had already been established drew 
no immediately cooperative response from Marshal Mannerheim.
12Ziemke, 19̂ -196.*
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The large percentage of the population in uniform had begun 
to tell on the nation’s economy. In August, Mannerheim had 
been forced to begin the release of the fourth platoon in 
every infantry company. In addition to this, the casualty 
rates were much higher than they had been for the Winter War. 
Mannerheim also knew from experience that the Bussian forti­
fications in the area would be very strong. In view of 
these factors, he said that the attack could best be accom­
plished by the German forces. ̂
The decision regarding the future deployment of Finnish 
troops was not altogether in Mannerheim’s hands. Leading 
industrialists in Finland had been telling the' Marshal that 
Finland’s economy would collapse unless more men were re­
leased from the army. The Finnish constitution also required 
that the Commander-In-Chief receive permission from the Diet 
before he committed troops past Finland’s borders. Mannerheim 
had strong control over his arms?' an^ his influence in the 
government was immense. If he had wanted to continue the 
offensive, he-could have done so, but he .was forced to con­
sider Finland’s best interests. Finnish troops had already 
crossed both the border established In 1940 and the pre- 
Wlnter War boundary, but Mannerheim maintained that this had. 
been done.to establish "defensive positions; ’’ If the Germans 
continued their demand for a renewal of the offensive,
 ̂-^Kannerhe im, 42 6 -42 7 i
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•Mannerheim could stall them by pointing to Finland's internal' 
economic problems. At this point in the war, the waiting 
game was exactly what' the Marshal wanted to"play. If Army 
Group North continued to meet stiff resistance around 
Leningrad, it would mean that the Finns would .have a greater 
distance to go before they could link up with' the Germans,
If the German thrust were strong enough to move'east rapidly 
and, at the same time, force the Russians to withdraw some 
of their forces in the Ladoga area, the Finns' might contem­
plate an attack. In the meantime, Mannerheim could afford to 
stall, his offensive in order to watch the progress of Army 
Group North. A premature Finnish attack, unsupported by the
German advance, would produce a highly untenable salient into 
-. . ■ 1AR u s s ia .
The fact that Mannerheim refused to.go on the offensive 
caused considerable consternation at OKH, The High Command 
altered its plans for. a tight encirclement of the outskirts 
of Leningrad in order to divert forces toward the Svir.
Mow, the eastern arc of the encirclement would be several 
miles from the city, but it would still be effectively iso­
lated . The movement toward the Svir was intended to encourage 
Finland to continue Its offensive and keep the Russians tied 
down on the Ladoga front. At the end of August, the Germans 
captured the last remaining railroad into Leningrad, but
^Ziemke, 197-198.
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the Russians could still supply the city through the gap 
that existed from that point to the positions held by the 
Finns north of the Svir. ̂-5
The German High Command again asked the Finns for assis­
tance , this time from a different direction. If Leningrad 
were taken rather than beseiged, the attempt to link up with 
the Finns would lose much of its significance, and the large 
number of troops now stalemated on the perimeter of.the city 
could be used to continue the attack to the east and to the 
south. OKH now wanted the Finns to continue their offensive 
on the Karelian.Isthmus to relieve some of the pressure of 
the Soviet defenses to the south and to the west of. the city, 
Mannerheim again refused, but he did agree to continue the 
attack in the east to the Svir, Mannerheim was not trying 
to be unduly obstinate. He did want the Germans to win the
war in the north, but he did not want to participate in the
16destruction of Leningrad, In fact, he had claimed that he 
assumed the command in the war on the condition that he would 
not have to lead his forces against Leningrad. He knew the 
extremes the Soviets would go to in order to protect the 
city and he did not wish to face these defenses. Then too, 
Mannerheim had to consider the post-war consequences if 
Russia should be victorious. The Soviet terms with Finland
^Ziemke, 199* 
■^Mannerheim, R26-^27-.
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would be much harsher If it took part in the destruction of
17 _Leningrad,"u‘ After viewing the situation more closely,
Mannerheim decided that the strength of Army Group North was
not sufficient to launch the heavy attack that he wanted to
use to cover the movement of his own troops. On September 251
he.informed OKH that an advance on either the Karelian or
the Ladoga Fronts was impossible, because he was being forced
to convert divisions into brigades to help alleviate the
1 Pcivilian manpower shortage.
In mid-October the Germans did begin a drive east
toward Tikhvin. The city was taken in November. But the
Russian resistance coupled with the winter weather' forced
the German army to retreat to the west bank of the Volkhov
River, where Hitler ordered that the line be held to the.
19last man. '
On August 18, the United States, upon Russia's request, 
communicated a peace offer to Finland. No reply was received 
in response.^ This was unusual. Although the Finns had no
^Mannerheim, 9l6-4l7.
l82iemke, 200-201. -
■^Ibid., 202-203« For a thorough study of the resistance 
offered by the city of Leningrad, see Leon Goure's The Selge 
of Leningrad (Stanford, California.* Stanford University Press, 
1952).
^ Foreign Relations of the United States, 19^1, Vol. I 
(Washington; United States Government printing Office, 1958)> 
56-57* Hereafter cited as United States Foreign Relations.
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intentions of withdrawing from the war at this time, they 
still desired to maintain good relations with the Allies.
The Allies were still sympathetic with Finland. The Finnish 
Legation in London.had been closed on July 28, but the Bri­
tish .continued to retain consular offices -in- Helsinki. Great. 
Britain-wanted - to see Finland get out of the war, but it had
made no overt objections to the Finnish advance to the
21pre-Winter War borders. On October 27, the American State
Department asked the Finns to pull back to the 1939 borders,
22Finland again refused, Finland's refusal of the overtures 
made by the United States and Great Britain was now to a 
large extent caused by German pressures, Germany was Fin­
land's chief source of war materials and :grains, If it-..with­
drew from the -war now, it would have nowhere to turn for. 
these commodities. Germany was also anxious to see Finland ■ 
break away from diplomatic contact with the West, Since the 
German Foreign Office realized that the Finns would not make 
the break of their own accord, it decided to place Finland- 
in a compromising position. In late October, the Finnish ... 
.Government was informed that Germany 'wanted it.to sign the.. 
Anti-Comintern pact which was being renewed' In Berlin on 
November 27. It was hinted that grain shipments would - be' • 
suspended if Finland did not comply. Germany hoped that
p 1' Mannerheim, 432
^United States Foreign'Relations, 1941, Vol. I, 82-84
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Finland, by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact', would be that 
much nearer to a full alliance with the Reich.. This in turn 
would cause the Allies to lose their sympathy for Finland and 
force the Finns into still, closer cooperation with the German 
war aims. On November 2?, Foreign Minister Witting flew to 
Berlin to sign the Pact. The event was given wide publicity 
to the dismay of the Finns, who wished the signing to remain
• 23as secret: as possible.
The year 19^1 ended with a virtual impasse on all fronts
near Finland. In January of 19*f2, one major change was made
in German strategy for the North, General von Falkenhorst
had been ordered back to Norway at the beginning of the year,
and General Dieted replaced him as the Commander of all German
forces in Finland. The United States’ entry Into the war had
caused. 'Hitler to become more apprehensive, and he believed
that' Norway had to be strengthened further. The British navy
■had recently shelled coastal positions in Norway and- made
commando raids on several off-shore islands. Hitler began to
,believe that Norway might prove the•"Zone of Destiny in this
War,” Accordingly, the Fuehrer ordered the transfer of the
battleships which had stationed at Brest to the Norwegian 
2 kcoast, in January and February, the ships did force their 
way through the English Channel, but while the'new plans
z^Zlemke, 207-208,
ph.~ Fuehrer Conferences, 19^2, 6,
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strengthened Norway, they also drew reserve strength from 
northern Finland.
At the beginning of 19^2, the plans for an offense 
against the Russians in the North were completely undecided 
after the failure of Silberfuchs. Since von Falkenhorst had 
returned to Norway, the Army of Norway had been renamed the 
Army of Lapland, and Hitler had promised to strengthen it 
with five fortress battalions for the Kirkenes-Pechenga area. 
Hitler was still interested in capturing Murmansk, but at 
the time he was more concerned with protecting the Petsamo 
nickel fields. However, before the new troops could arrive, 
ice had closed the northern Finnish ports, and the transfer 
-was postponed until the spring. The delay was a severe blow 
to the Army of-' the Lapland, as the additional units would 
have released some of the troops which had been guarding the 
area and this would have given a greater impetus to a new 
German offensive.
The severe winter weather and difficulties in supply 
and transportation caused the stalemate to continue through 
March» In late March and early April, the Finns had been 
able to capture several small islands in the Gulf of Finland, 
but no major offensive was begun by either side on any of 
the three fronts.
The Soviet army to the east of Salla had been successful
25Ziemke, 221-225.
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in its attempt to strengthen its numbers. The Army of Lap- \
’land was late in detecting the build up due to a severe-
shortage of reconnaissance planes, but when it was discovered-/'
■General Dieted thought that the Russians would not attempt
an immediate offensive, The spring thaw was imminent and
the roads would soon be impassable. The Soviets, however,
saw this as an advantage; they planned to advance before the"
thaw began, and then stop to solidify their, gains with no •:
P Afear, of a counterattack after the roads.did turn to mud. °
The Soviet offensive was launched- on April' '2k, The 
attack gained some ground, but the Germans inflicted large 
losses on the Russians and they were forced to pull back 
because of a lack of fresh troops. General Dieted, at the 
height of the attack, had asked the Finnish 12th Brigade be 
assigned to his III Corps, Mannerheim refused when he thought 
that he would permanently lose the unit in the prolonged 
struggle to the north, By May 7» the Russian attack had 
been completely'halted, and Dieted decided to risk a speedy 
counterattack while the’Russians were still off balance. The 
Germans, like the■Russians, also saw their plans stymied by 
bad weather, During the course of the limited counterattack, 
the Finnish troops under Dieted*s command, showed an indepen­
dence of mind that bordered on-insubordination. General 
Siilasvuo, the Finnish commander in the north halted his
ofZiemke, 223-225,
132
■units’ attack without permission, threatened to withdraxf 
his troops from the attack, and demanded that all the horses 
and wagons which the Finns had loaned to the Germans be 
returned, at once. General Dietel was forced to appeal to 
Siilasvuo in the name of "brotherhood-in-arms" to keep him 
from endangering the flanks of the German’s advanced posi-
+ , _ c. 2?
By the end of the summer, the battle lines had changed 
little. However, the Germans claimed that they had been 
victorious during those months because of.the heavy losses 
they had inflicted on the attacking Russian forces. The most 
notable change in the.course of the campaign was the fact 
that nearly all of the Finnish units in the area were removed 
by September 25* Dietel did not want to have to depend on
pQcommanders and men who were not responsive to his commands.
The war in the extreme north of Finland also showed 
little progress. On June Hitler and General Keitel flew 
to Finland for military talks and also to honor Marshal 
Mannerheim on his seventy-fifth birthday. In the conferences 
General Dietel told Hitler that the Army of Lapland did not 
have enough troops either to take or to hold the Eybatc-hiy 
Peninsula. Hitler-was reluctant'to give up this part of the 
operation in the north, as he still believed that this area
27Ziemke9 225-22?.
28Ibid., 228.
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could be used as an Allied landing point. The Fuehrer
decided to strengthen the Fifth Air Force in- the area, but
he could still not spare more troops.^9
In June the Army of the Lapland was redesignated as the
Twentieth Mountain Army. As doubtful as the operation was,
it was still assigned the task of securing the Rybatchiy
Peninsula. Plans, under the code name Wiesengrund, were
drawn up, but, as Dietel had predicted, his army lacked the
reserves and the transportation to begin the offensive, In
order to mount some kind of an attack in.the north, Operation
Lachsfang was planned in late July, This scheme called for
•an. attack on the Murmansk Railroad In the area of Kandalaksha,
The Germans were to use the heavy air support from the Fifth
Air Force and 80,000 men In the attack, twice the number
used to support Platinfuchs in 1941. The offensive was to
begin in September, and the Finns were requested to mount an
auxiliary attack from the south. General Heinrichs agreed to
the plan, but he said that Leningrad would have to be- taken
and an advance made to the Svir River before he could promise
onfull cooperation.-'
Operation Lachsfang promised some success if the Finns 
gave the necessary support, but the Finnish participation 
hinged on the outcome of Army Group North's attempt to take
“^ziemke, 229-230; and Mannerheim, 450-454, 
9Ibid. > 231-233; and 456.
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Leningrad before the northern attack began. Fuehrer Direc­
tive Number 45 of July 23, 1942, ordered that Leningrad be 
taken by September. Army Group North was to be strengthened 
by five divisions from Army Group South. The.command of 
.Army Group North still felt that the operation would, take a 
minimum of -three months to complete even with the additional 
support. The Russians now had thirteen divisions facing the 
Germans in the north, and the total German strength, with 
the additional troops would be ten divisions, eight short of 
the number that was felt would be needed to gain a speedy 
victory. '
On August 8 , General Georg, von Kueehler, who had "re- • 
placed General von Leeb as the commander of Army Group. North, 
told Hitler that he would need more troops to take Leningrad. 
His arm;;- was outnumbered by two to one, and he believed that 
it would take until the end of October to complete the tacti­
cal plans unless a large number of reinforcements could be 
brought up. Hitler had no more troops to spare, and the 
operation had to be completed by September to give the Finns 
time to move their forces into position for Lachsfang. The 
The attack was then scheduled for September 10, and General 
Manstein, who had just directed the successful seige of 
Sevastopol, was brought in to try to work a miracle at
Ziemke, 233? and Mannerheim, 458.
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opLeningrad. The attack was now named Operation SNordlicht
Even Manstein was not confident of success at Leningrad.
'He felt that massive air and artillery strikes could not be
counted on to break the Soviet resistance v. He also believed
that the attack on Leningrad could best be made from the '
Karelian Isthmus, and, in any event, the operation would have
to be made by attacks from both the ’-German and the Finnish.
33fronts.
Before the Germans had a chance to begin Operation
Nordlicht, the Soviet Union began Its own offensive in order
3 kto open a land avenue to Leningrad. The Soviet attack 
gained a small breakthrough and Operation' N.ordlicht was com­
pletely thrown off schedule. -On September 1, Hitler announced., 
that Operation Lachsfang was cancelled for 19^2 and the imple--' 
mentation of Nordlicht was made dependent on the continuation ■
of good weather and the ability to-assemble the necessary '
troops. On September 4, the Finnish Army Headquarters stated;
that the possibility of Finland’s participating In Nordlicht
35was "extremely limited."
■32ZIemke, 233-23^.
-^Warlimont, 253-25 *̂
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J 'The Russians had been forced to bring supplies across 
Lake Ladoga by .-ferry In the summer and by truck in the winter 
when the Lake was frozen over,
-^Zienike, 233-235« Marshal Mannerheim almost completely 
ignored Operation Nordlicht in his memoirs,
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Germany's hopes of beginning Nordlicht were vastly over 
optimistic. The Russian attack on the German right flank 
; continued until mid-October. The weather had now begun to 
turn, and the Finns still showed no signs that they would 
cooperate. At the end of the month, the additional troops 
which had been given to Army Group North were sent south to 
help cover the line between Leningrad and Moscow. With 
this decision, Operation Nordlicht had to be postponed 
i nde finitely.-^
The year 19̂ -2 had produced no visible Nazi gains in the 
North, and there were signs that Germany's position was 
beginning to deteriorate. German troops were now extended 
from the Arctic Ocean.to the Black Sea, and the quick vic­
tories that-Hitler had hoped would envelope and destroy large 
numbers of Russian troops, .had not materialized. Now that 
-the Soviet Union had had a chance to strengthen its forces, 
the Fuehrer was forced to juggle his troops to gain the 
necessary strength to mount an offensive at any given point. 
The war of attrition had now begun to tell on the forces of 
the'Reich. Finland continued, to bide its time, waiting to 
see how the course of the war would turn before it continued 
to give support to Germany.
The year 19^3 became a year of decision and a time of 
frustration for the Nazis. It had now been almost a year and
•>&Ziemke, 236,
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.a half since the German army had arrived at the outskirts 
of Leningrad and the city had still not fallen. The front 
in the north of Finland had become so static that OKH 
referred to It as "the front without combat activity," in 
the North Sea and the Arctic, British naval superiority 
remained to threaten the German supply routes to the north 
and cause Hitler to worry about a possible Allied invasion 
of Norway or Finland.
The recent Allied efforts in Africa, had made Hitler 
increasingly apprehensive that the Allies might also try to 
spread the war to the north, The Fuehrer8s suspicions had 
also extended to Sweden, He believed that Sweden would 
cooperate with the Allies if an attack did develop. If the 
Allies did gain control of the Norwegian coast, the Army of 
Norway and the troops In northern 'Finland would be virtually 
Isolated from their supply routes. On February 10, orders 
were sent to Norway to begin plans for an invasion of Sweden, 
By the " end of March the plan had. nearly been completed'"; 
however, the operation was never put into effect, Troops 
from Norway would have to be used in the attack, and this 
would weaken the coastal defenses of Norway, An attack on 
Sweden at this time might cause the Allied invasion that it 
was trying to prevent. The German navy also believed that 
Leningrad would have to be captured and the Soviet Baltic 
Fleet eliminated before naval support could be given to the
1 O Q -I J  O
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In January of 1943, the Germans were experiencing diffi­
culties on all three fronts In Russia, The German Sixth 
Army was facing defeat near Stalingrad,• and the Russian 
offensive that had begun on Army Group North's right flank 
was continuing to broaden the gap between Lake Ladoga and 
Leningrad, The Soviet offensive in the north had lasted for 
two and a half months, and it had cost them over a quarter of 
a million casualties, but the advance was a severe shock to 
Finnish morale. The further the Germans were driven back, 
the more isolated the Finnish forward positions became. If 
Leningrad were freed from the seige, the Finns could expect 
to feel increased Soviet pressure In their sectors.
At a conference at the Fuehrer Headquarters on January 14, 
Old'/ tried to assess the value of the Finnish army in the war. 
The assessment produced, a decidedly negative estimate, It 
was felt that the military strength of the Finns had been 
overestimated• The Finnish army had no inclination to mount 
any supporting offensives. It was almost without reserves, 
and it was expected to lose ground to s, Soviet attack. Its 
only advantage seemed to be that, while it continued to hold 
its defensive positions, the Soviets were forced to keep 
troops in the Finnish sectors, troops which the Soviet Union
'"'^Ziemke, 252-264, pas s 1m, 
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3°would 11 ice to use to free Leningrad..-"'
While OKW was theorizing on the role of' the Finnish: V 
'army, Finland was examining its own position. On February: jt ■
•the day after the German surrender at Stalingrad, MannerheimV;
President Ryti, Defense Minister Walden, and Prime Minister 
Range11 met to discuss the situation. They were particularly 
worried about the fact that the German retreat- from Leningrad, 
which was not yet too serious, would bring a heavy Russian 
counterattack against the Karelian Isthmus, During the con­
ference, they agreed on two points s. the war had reached a
turning point and Finland must use the first possible oppor-
i]* 0tunity to get out of it.
A secret session of the Diet met on February 9, and
Colonel Paasonen, Head of the Intelligence Department, gave
the representatives a review of the military and political
situation at the time. He stated that Germany and her Allies
had lost sixty divisions on the eastern front. Germany was
beginning to weaken, and an Allied attack on France would
cause the - collapse of the German army• He ended his resume'"
by saying that it■would be wise to become familiar once again
with the idea of being forced to conclude a second peace with 
4lKOS C O V .
-^Ziemke, 242-243' 
^Mannerheim, ^60,
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New elections were held in Finland on February 15? and 
■President Ryti, with the support of Marshal Mannerheim, was 
again chosen to lead his country. Ryti's first task was to 
try to construct a new government that could extricate Fin­
land from the war. Dr. Henrik Ramsay, who was reputed to
have excellent connections with Great Britain, was chosen as
_  b?the new Foreign Minister. ~ It was not long before Finland
received news from the Allies. On March 20, the United State 
Charge d 8Affaires offered to help establish diplomatic con­
tact between Finland and the Soviet Union.^
Dr. Ramsay’s first mistake in his new post was the 
communication of the united States' offer and Finland’s in­
tentions to Germany's Foreign Minister. Ramsay felt that he 
could begin to pave the way for a "friendly withdrawal" from 
the war, but Bibhentrop soon dispelled this naive contention. 
Bibbentrop demanded that Finland reject the American offer 
and. Issue a public declaration that it would not sign a sepa­
rate peace with the Soviet Union. Finland could not afford 
to refuse because it was still dependent on Germany for a 
large percentage of its foodstuffs, but it realized that the 
decl.ara.tion would endanger Its position with both the Soviet 
union and the Western Allies. The American Charge' was' told 
that Finland was unfortunately unable to avail itself of the
“f^Mannerhe im, ^62-^63.
^ U n i t e d  States Foreign Relations, 1943, III, 251-253
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offer. This vjas not enough for Ribbentrop% he 'wanted some 
assurance that Finland would not negotiate a separate peace*
To add force to his words, he recalled Ambassador von Bluecher 
back to Berlin for "consultations." On May 16, President Ryti 
did relent to a degree and made a speech that declared' that 
Finland would rather continue the war than throw itself on 
the mercy of the Soviet Union. This.statement went far 
enough to guarantee the continuation of German grain ship­
ments, but Ribbentrop still realized that the Finns were
L'bhesitant to mention an alliance with Germany.r*
OKU- believed that a German victory in the north would be 
necessary to keep the Finns in the war. As long as the Ger­
man army was present in the Leningrad sector, a modicum of 
cooperation was expected from the Finns. A continued stale­
mate in the district would cause Finland to continue to 
think about withdrawing from the war? 8- German retreat would 
almost necessitate hurried Finnish negotiations with the 
Soviet Union, J Thus the dilemma continued to present itself: 
the Germans were depending on Finland's cooperation to main­
tain' their positions in the north while the prospect of . 
Finnish cooperation was entirely dependent on the continued 
maintenance of the German positions.
The war in northern Finland was all but forgotten while
^Mannerheim, ^63-^6^; and Ziemke, 243-2*i4.
" JZIemke , 2kk-2k$ ,
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new plans were made for the Leningrad front. Hitler, knowing 
the importance of Leningrad to the German position in the 
east, ordered on March 13, that plans be made for the cap­
ture of the city by late summer, Army Group North felt than 
a new offensive in the ares, was now dependent on what the 
Russians would attempt during the summer months. It had been 
felt that the Soviets would either continue its offensive 
near Leningrad or attempt to break through the German line 
at the point of conjunction between Army Group North and 
Army Group Center. If the Russians did go on the offensive t
it was not known if the Germans could stabilize the front
bnlong enough to launch an attack of their own.
The operational plan for the capture of Leningrad was 
•drawn up by General Kuechler* s staff and given the code name 
Parkplatz. The beginning of Parlcplatz was made dependent on 
the success of Array Group South's latest offensive. If Array 
Group South could eliminate the salient formed by Russia's 
winter offensive in the south, eight to nine divisions could 
be transferea north to Leningrad, This strategy proved to 
be too optimistic. The German attack in the south, which 
began on'July 5» was repulsed, and the Soviet counterattack 
pushed the Germans back to the Enieper River. On July 22, 
the Soviet .array in the north began an all-out offensive to 
free Leningrad, In facing impending disaster in both the
46’Ziemke, 2d?,
now 'begun to set up defensive positions approximately 125
a 7miles southwest of Leningrad.
In July, she Finns continued to prepare for a withdrawal 
from the war. During the course of the month, the Russian 
Legation in Stockholm informed the Belgian Minister that the 
Soviet Union would be willing to begin peace negotiations 
if Finland made the first step. Finland replied that It 
would consider the 1939 frontiers as a basis for negotiations, 
but it would consider a rectification of the boundaries,
The United States was also, told that Finland would do nothing 
to prevent an Allied invasion of Norway, nor would it resist 
a movement into Finnish territory. In August, thirty-three 
prominent Finns presented Ryti with a petition calling for 
a withdrawal from the war, and the Finnish press began to 
agitate ior a separate peace.
Army Group North continued to hold around Leningrad 
after a month and a. half of defending against.the Soviet 
offensive. However, work did continue on the defensive posi­
tions on the Narva River-Lake peipus line. The Twentieth 
Mountain Army on September lb, told OK¥ that it thought that 
Army Group North's withdrawal from Leningrad would endanger 
its positIon in the north. The retreat would force the Finns
47Ziemke, 297. 
"^Mannerheim, 967.
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to retreat from their present positions, shorten their lines,
and redeploy a majority of their forces to the Karelian
Isthmus * The retread; could even cause the fall of President
Ryti's government.and the election of a .new president mho
would be in a better position to negotiate with the Soviet
Union. If negotiations were begun and a treaty signed,, the
German forces would be forced to retreat into northern
Norway under winter conditions. A week after this re-port
was filed, the Finnish Government accented Army Group North's
pessimism when it informed the German High -Command that a
retreat from Leningrad would have the "most serious conse-
Lic<quences" for Finland. ,y
The Finns were not yet in a crisis situation. Their 
army outnumbered by two to one the Russian forces which•faced 
•them. Despite this numerical superiority, the Finns refused 
to attack. An offensive would complicate future negotiations 
with the .Soviet Union and allienate Finland from the western 
Allies. Then, given the weakness of Army Group North's 
position, the attack would only bring temporary' success. If 
the Finns .'advanced and the Germans retreated, Finland would' 
also have to give, up its gains
On September 28, the Twentieth Mountain Army received 
Fuehrer Directive Number 50. It said, that the position of
"^Zlemke, 2A8. 
5°lbid., 2^9.
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Army Gro'ap North had been "stabilized," but unfavorable 
developments were being prepared for. In the event that 
Finland withdrew from the war, the forces of the Twentieth 
Mountain Army were to move back from its present positions
to a line south of Petsamo. The nickel mines- were to be
5 fheld as long as possible, “ Later, OKH.was informed by 
General Dietel that Mar-Directive Dumber 50 mas impractical, 
He felt that the British would be able to interdict his 
supply -lines through the Arctic, and this would leave the 
Twentieth Mountain Army without provisions, protecting mines 
whose ore could no longer be transferred to Germany.d4-
The German array's position in the - Leningrad' sector was 
made even more tenuous when the Russian army launched a new- 
offensive designed to break the line between Army Group North 
and Army Group Center, Within three days the German armies 
had lost contact with each other. Mannerheim now began to 
think about preparing defensive positions of his own. If the 
Twentieth Mountain Army was forced to retreat, the Marshal 
wanted to build a defense line west of the point where the 
Germans were now entrenched. On October lb, General Jodi 
flew from OKU Headquarters to Helsinki for conferences with 
Mannerheim and the Finnish Minister of Defense. Jodi tried 
to be as encouraging as he possibly could. He reported that
' Uarlimont, 398 
-^Ziemke, 251 •
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Italy* s recent set backs had not been a severe blow to the 
Reich, and Germany looked forward to a confrontation with 
the'Allies in Prance. Jodi said, that the German defenses 
In Prance would destroy the Allied land forces and allow 
Germany to release troops for the Russian campaign. The 
General noted that he knew of Finland’s- desire to get out of 
the 'war, but he warned that Russia’s peace conditions would 
be harsh. He concluded his argument by saying' that Finland 
had two alternatives: continue the war as an ally of Germany 
and protect its -homeland or risk Bolsnevization by surrender.^
The Finnish Government considered the situation so acute 
that it disregarded Jodi’s advice and tried to' reopen contact 
with Moscow through Madame Kollontai, the Russian Minister in 
Stockholm. The Finnish request was transmitted to Madame 
Kollontai through the Swedish Foreign Office, and she said 
that Finland could send a representative to Moscow. A repre­
sentative was not sent, "out Finland did let Russia know that 
it was ready to conclude a peace if areas and cities which 
were vital to its national existence were not claimed by the 
Soviet■Union. Madame Kollontai then informed Finland, her 
personal opinion was that the recognition of the 1940 fron™ 
tiers would have' to be made before talks could begin.
The Russian offensive about Nevel, had not produced a
-'’Mamierhe im, 468 -469• 
^Tbid.,- 470.
i hi
decisive victory, but it caused the Germans to continue to 
contemplate a withdrawal. Hitler realized the effect that 
the retreat would have on the Finns, but he felt that they 
would be forced to, continue the fight for at least a short 
time longer, giving the German army at least, a minimum of 
relief while it established its new positions. On December.
31, Hitler-drafted a letter to Mannerheim, informing him that 
a retreat was imminent, but the letter was never sent.
The retreat from Leningrad was postponed in early January, 
of 19^4, because of the difficulty it would cause for Fin­
land and also because it would give the -Soviet Union a 
cleaner control of the Baltic, On January 14, the Prussians 
began another offensive in the Leningrad sector. By the 
17th, Novgorod was encircled, and Leningrad was completely 
liberated on the 19th. General Kuechler ordered his troops - 
to withdraw to the defensive positions to escape being • 
encircled. Hitler was enraged to think that the positions 
could not be held. He ordered Kuechel to Germany and' re~ 
placed him with General Halter Model.J
On January 30, the.American Charge d*Affaires presented. 
President .Ryti with a note which asked that Finland take the■ 
first steps toward making peace with Russia.Mannerheim
-^Ziemke, 252,
56rbid,, 272-273,
•^United States Foreign Relations. 19^4t Ills 563.
was foi? the proposal, as he believed that Germany had lost 
the war, and a Russian offensive against -Finland could not 
be restrained for long.-^ with this advice in mind, Presi­
dent Ryti sent Juho Paasikivi to Stockholm to receive Soviet- 
peace terms from Madame Kollontai. The Russian demands.": 
included the restoration of the Winter War Treaty, interniaen 
of German troops in Finland, demobilization, and war repara-,, 
tions. .When Paasikivi returned to Helsinki on February 23, 
the demands were discussed by the leaders of state because, 
they felt that Finland was not capable of- interning the 
German forces. A negative reply was returned,- but the Swedish
Foreign Minister persuaded the Finns to indicate that -they
<9hoped further negotiations could begin.
Stalin had promised during the Tehran Conferences of 
December, 1943, to offer Finland a peace that would preserve 
its national independence, so Finland was invited to send 
representatives to Moscow to begin negotiations. On March 
25, Paasikivi and former Foreign Minister Carl Enckell
6oleft for the Kremlin, When they arrived, they were given 
the basis of the- peace which Stalin had earlier outlined to 
Churchill and Roosevelt. It included: (1) internment or 
expulsion of the German troops in Finland by the end of
d8,Mannerheim, 4?1
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April, (2) restoration of the 19^0 borders, (3) exchange of 
prisoners, (1) demobilization of the Finnish army, (5) pay­
ment of a war reparation of six-hundred million American 
dollars over a period of five years, and (6) the return of
Pechenga to the Soviet Union in exchange for the Russian
6lrelinquishment of it's lease on Eanko,
. The negotiation team returned to Helsinki on April 1, 
and reported the peace proposals to the Diet, Finland was 
still not capable of interning or expelling the German army, 
especially by the end of April® The war reparation demanded 
by the Soviet Union was far more than the Finns felt they 
were capable of paying. Instead of serving as a basis of 
peace, the demand- brought only memories of'the post-Winter 
:War years, On April 18, the Russian proposals were rejected, 
and Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky warned the Finnish
Government that it would have to bear the responsibility for
• ' A?whatever followed.
In April, General Heinrichs was Invited to the Fuehrer
•Headquarters at Berchtesgaden by General Keitel,, At the
meeting, both General Keitel and General Jodi expressed
their dissatisfaction with the Finnish cooperation, General
Jodi said that Finland would have to make a declaration that
01Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 195751 268-269.
fsO^Mannerheim, 473-^7^-•’
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German military equipment mould not fall into the hands of
the Russians, Mannerhelm did attempt to fulfill the German
demand in a letter, but Hitler refused it saying that it
mas too cautious. The arms shipments to Finland were not
continued, but it was stated that Finnish requests would be
considered on an individual basis, To- increase the pressure
on Finland, grain shipments were also halted.0-'’
The quiet that had been maintained on the Finnish fronts
was broken on June 9. On that day the Soviet army began a
massive assault on the western base of.the Karelian Isthmus,
The attack, supported by three-hundred artillery pieces for
every half mile of the front, pushed the Finnish defenders
back six miles in just a few hours, The Finns were forced
to retreat north to their second line of defense, Finland
had organized three separate lines of defense on the isthmus:
one at the base, a few miles north at the point where the
isthmus began to widen, and the third was emplaced just
north of Viipuri. Mannerheim realized that it would be
futile to try to hold between the first and second lines, so
he had his men move-back behind the new defensive position
and brought down replacements from the Viipuri sector. He
also asked for and received an immediate continuation of the
64Shipment of arms and grain.
^Mannerheim, k?k-k■75‘> and Ziemke, 275. 
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’ The Marshal was also forced to evacuate his troops 
from Soviet Karelia on June 15» When General Heinrichs 
communicated this news to General Dieted, the commander of 
the Twentieth Mountain Corps was not angered by the with­
drawal; in fact, he had been worried that the Finns might 
have tried, to hold- the position until an effective retreat 
would have been impossible, Now the Finns could shorten 
their lines in a stronger defensive position northeast of 
Lake Ladoga and protect the southern flank of the German 
forces„
While the Finns were still, completing their retreat 
from the Svir, the Russians broke through Finland's second 
line of defense on the Karelian Isthmus, Now it was a ques­
tion of whether, the Finns could regroup their forces in time 
to make a stand, behind Viipuri, where they had made such a 
prolonged defense against the Russians in the Winter War, 
There was, however, little cause for optimism: The Russians
were in complete command of most of the isthmus - and now out-
66numoerea the Finns by two to one,
The military crisis on the Karelian Isthmus produced a 
corresponding political crisis in Helsinki, Finland needed 
additional arms to check the Russian offensive, and it was 
forced to draw closer to an alliance with Germany in order
6> ^-JMannerheim, -̂73} a*id Ziemke, 280-281, 
^%'Iannerheim, ^79-^80.
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to get them. On June 18, General Heinrichs requested that 
six German divisions be sent to Finland to cover the Finnish 
troops while they moved from the Svir to the Karelian Isthmus. 
Germany did send the 122nd Infantry Division and air units 
from the Fifth Air Force, but Mannerheim had to promise 
Hitler that Finland was ready to establish closer ties with 
Germany to get this aid.°7
Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop arrived in Finland on 
June 22 to extract a promise from President Eyti that neither 
he nor any member of his government would negotiate a separate 
peace with the Soviet Union. While Ribbentrop was still in 
Helsinkis the Soviet. Union communicated to the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry through Stockholm that Finland would have to capi­
tulate before a peace could be made, The Soviets indicated 
that since they had made previous peace offers they no longer 
trusted Finland to enter Into honest negotiations. This left 
.Finland with signing an unconditional surrender with Russia, ■ 
or signing the agreement with Germany and try to continue 
the war uriti1 Russia offered better terms. Neither choice 
appealed to the Finns, but they once again turned to the 
Germans rather than the Russians. On June 26, Ribbentrop
°•'’Ziemke, 28.1-282. Mannerheim completely ignores this. 
.He mentions only -that he requested a few planes from General 
Erfurth of- the German High Command. He does mention that 
this led to Ribbentrop8s subsequent visit to Helsinki, but 
he does not explain his own part in- bringing the German 
Foreign Minister to Finland.
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threatened that all aid would cease unless the agreement 
mere signed. President Ryti relented, and he issued a 
letter stating that neither he, nor anyone appointed by
68him, would sign a peace treaty not approved by Germany,
The value of Ribbentrop*s diplomatic coup was doubtful.
If'Finland did decide to sign a separate peace, Germany
could not possibly hope to make the agreement stand by
threatening to withhold arms because the Finns would no y
longer have any need for them. The only positive result of '
the' treaty as far as Germany was concerned was that Finland
had not been branded as an ally of the Reich, One week after
Ryti * s letter was delivered to Hitler , the United States
broke off diplomatic relations with Finland, but. it did not . 
69declare war, y
The Finns had had only one object in mind when they 
signed the agreement with Germany —  arms' to stop the Soviet 
offensive. Arms were delivered to Finland, but not in the 
amount promised by Ribbentrop. Mannerheim, however, believed 
that the addition of the one German division plus the new 
anti-tank weapons would stabilize the front until more
favorable peace conditions could be won from the Soviet
j r .. 70bin on.
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The situation on the German eastern front continued to 
grow worse. Army Group Center m s  pushed back into Poland, 
and by mid-July it looked as if Army Group North would have 
to retreat behind the Dvina River. Hitler ordered his troops 
to hold at all cost; a retreat now would cause Hitler to
n  -jlose complete control of the eastern BalticJ
The fact that the Allies had invaded France in June gave
some relief to the Finns, Marshal Mannerheim noted that the
Russians were beginning to withdraw many of its troops from
the Karelian Isthmus in order to concentrate on driving the
Germans from the Baltic States, Mannerheim attributed-the
change In tactics on the' Russian's desire to beat the Allies 
noto Berlin A~
Either way the Soviet Union directed its attack, Finland 
was ultimately going to be the loser. If the attack on the 
Karelian Isthmus continued, Finland could not hope to hold 
out for long. If the Russians continued to attack Army Group 
North In the Baltic States, Finland would soon lose its only 
supply line and become Isolated from German protection and 
supplies except for the troops of the Twentieth Mountain 
Army in the north.
The time had now come for Finland to make- a decision.
It had long been tired of the war and continued to fight only
^Ziemke, 286-287, 
^Mannerheim, 484-485•
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because it hoped to extract more favorable peace terms from 
the Soviet Union. Germany had treated Finland expediently, 
and sines the German army now seemed to be losing its last 
footholds in Eastern Europe, there was no need to continue 
the war to honor the "brotherhood in arms" with the Nazis.
As a first step to ending Finland's participation in 
the war. President Ryti resigned on July 28, and urged 
Marshal Mannerheim to accept the Presidency. Eyti's position 
as head of state had been seriously compromised by the agree­
ment Ribbentrop had forced him to sign. He felt that the 
Russians, who were already suspicious of the Finns’ intentions 
to negotiate, would never begin talks with a' government 
headed by a man who was committed to continue the war. On 
August 1, Ryti submitted his resignation, and on the 4th the 
Diet unanimously passed a bill elevating Mannerheim to the 
presidency without the formal consent of the College of
ry
Electors.1J
Ryti's resignation and Mannerheim5s election came as a 
surprise to the Germans. For them it was difficult to pre­
dict the course that the new president would take. Mannerheim 
was rersona non grata, in Moscow, and he was also the symbol 
of Finland’s military establishment. The Marshal, however, 
was a realist in -political affairs, and it had been he who 
had suggested that Finland get out of the Winter War. In
 ̂̂Manne rhe im, 491-^92.
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order to encourage Finland to remain in the war, General
Keitel and General Schoerner, who had replaced Model as
commander of Army Group North, were sent to Helsinki to
7.1■ promise renewed support. - -
Army Group North was now in a very precarious position
as the Russians still threatened to surround it in the Baltic.
Mannerheim welcomed the news that the Germans would continue
to hold. He was not glad because it would give him. a chance
to continue the war, but because Finland would have a. chance
.to conclude peace before it was completely isolated.
Mannerheim was very frank with General Keitel. He told him
/
that Ryti•s resignation had nullified the Ryti-Ribbentrop
agreement, and Finland no longer honored the commitment to
a s k ’Germany's permission before a separate peace was con-
i - - 75 clu.aea,'
Later in August, the 'Swedish Government promised 
Mannerheim that Sweden would supply Finland with foodstuffs 
for a period of six months. Now that Finland was assured 
that it no longer had to depend on Germany for these supplies, 
it began to try to establish negotiations with Russia. On 
August 25>'through its embassy in Stockholm,.Finland asked 
if Moscow would receive negotiators, The next day the Finns 
were informed that 'Russia was ready to negotiate for peace
OilMannerheim, 5-92; and Ziemke, 288 
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if Finland, would immediately cease all -contact with Germany 
and see that the German troops withdrew from their country 
by no later than -September 15. The Soviet terms were 
accepted by Finland's Diet on September 2, and on the same 
day, diploma/tic relations were broken with Germany and the 
German commander in Finland was informed that his troops 
must evacuate at once, Marshal Mannerheim drafted a letter 
to Hitler explaining Finland's new intentions.
In this hour of hard decisions I am 
compelled to inform you that I have arrived 
at the conviction that the salvation of my 
nation makes it my duty to find a means to 
end the war»
I wish especially to emphasize that 
Germany will live on even if fate should 
not crown your arms with victory. Nobody 
could give such an assurance regarding 
Finland. If that nation of barely four 
millions.be militarily defeated, there can 
be little doubt-that it will be driven into 
exile or exterminated, I“cannot expose my 
people to such a fate.
I regard, it as my duty to lead my- people 
out of the war. The arms which you have so 
generously given us I will never of my own 
accord turn against Germans. I cherish the 
hope that, even though you may take excep­
tion to my letter, you will share the wish 
of all Finns, that the change in our gela­
tions may not give rise to animosity,
Again the Germans were surprised: they had continued to 
hope and believe that Finland would never accept the punitive 
Soviet terms. There was some discussion in Germany of trying
^Mannerheim, 493-495•
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to replace Mannerheim with a rpo-German government and
organizing resistance movements among the pro-Nazi segments
of the population. These suggestions bore more frustration
than logic, Mannerheim had complete control of his forces,
77and the Finnish people supported the move toward peace,'' 
Mannerheim continued contact with the Soviet Union by- 
negotiating a cease fire with Stalin on September 4. The 
Finnish Peace Delegation arrived in Moscow on September 7,- 
and the terms that were presented to them were similar to 
the ones that Stalin had outlined earlier to Churchill. The 
war reparations had been cut in half, but the Soviet Union 
now demanded the right'to use Finnish airfields, ports, and 
.Merchant Marine for the duration of the war. On September 19,
■the Diet gave its approval to' the terms, and the Continuation
78bar had come to an end,
Finland had technically ended its participation in the 
war, but it still had to cope with the article- of the peace 
treaty which stipulated that German troops were to be removed 
from the country in two weeks, Finland had no desire to 
face the 200,000 German troops in the north under hostile 
conditions. The Finns hoped that Germany would recognize 
the futility of trying to maintain its present positions in 
Finland and begin a peaceful retreat, Germ&ny was not in a
^Ziemke, 289-290, 
^Mannerheim, 497-501,
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position to maintain its 'present line of battle, but it did 
desire to hold and secure whatever positions it felt were 
necessary to maintain its interests in Norway and the Baltic* 
The German High Command had long ago made preparations 
for a withdrawal from Finland. In February of Opera­
tions Tarne and Birke were designed to remove German troops 
from southern and northern Finland and protect positions that 
the .Reich believed vital to Its war aims* Operation Tanne 
Nest would attempt to occupy the Aaland Islands, while Tanne 
Ost was to take the island of Suursaari in the Gulf of Fin­
land. Operation Birke provided for the withdrawal of the 
Twentieth Mountain Army and the establishment of defensive 
positions near P e c h a n g a . ^
Operation Tanne West and Ost proved 'to be impossible to 
begin in September. Sweden had considerable interest In the 
Aaland Islands, and OKH felt that the Swedes might cut off 
Germany's supply of iron ore if they were taken. On Septem-' 
ber 3,.Hitler cancelled Tanne West when he learned that the 
division in Denmark which was responsible for the 'operation 
could not be spared. Tanne Ost was similarly cancelled when
it was found that only untrained troops were available for
- 80the assault; on Suursaari.
•70 _ ,
' •'Warlimont, 41b? and Ziemke / 22o-22d •
®vl_bid., b72? and Ibid., 292»
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The Twentieth Mountain Army aid begin Operation Birke 
on September 6. The operational plans had not been divulged 
to the Finns, and Germany hoped, to establish defensive posi­
tions before either the Finnish or the Russian army could 
offer pursuit. The Finnish Government had told the German 
army that it believed that Russia would respect the 19^1 
borders,’ Germany, however, decided to conduct the retreat as
if It were being undertaken on enemy rather than friendly or
8neutral territory.
The XXVT Mountain Corps, which had not yet had time to 
withdraw from, its position between Sal la and. Kandalaksha, was 
surprised by Russian armored units on September 7. The 
Mountain Corps began Its retreat on the 9th, and the Russians 
halted their pursuit at S&lla as the German forces drew back 
west of the 19^0 Finnish border. The rest of the retreat 
from Finland went more smoothly on the west coast. The eva­
cuation from the Finnish ports on the Baltic Sea began on 
September 6 and in one week all military personnel had been 
removed from southern Finland.0^
The first open hostilities between Germany and Finland 
came during the second week of the evacuation. ' The German, 
High Command had begun to change its mind on Operation Tanne’ 
Ost when the Finnish commander on Suursaari said that he
LZiemke, 293.
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would never fire on German troops. Admiral Boenltz, who 
had been in charge of the German navy since 19*J-3, placed 
great importance on the island, He felt that if the island 
•could 'be occupied, Germany could-continue to block the Soviet 
Baltic Fleet's entrance to its naval, base at Kronstadt. 
Therefore, he proposed that Tanne Ost be set into motion by 
September 15* Troops were assembled at Reval and a landing 
was attempted on the 15th, Contrary to the light resistance 
that had been expected, the Finns opened fire on the German 
troops as they came out of their landing craft, and the 
Russians contributed heavy air strikes, The.Nazis were 
forced to rescue as many men as possible and return across 
the Gulf of Finland to Reval,
Finland did not regard the Suursaari episode as a pro­
vocation to begin open warfare against the Germans. In fact* 
the German attack was fortunate in that it gave the Finns a 
chance to prove that it was serious in its attempt to remove 
the German forces from their homeland. The German army 
finally made an agreement with Finland, that would facilitate
their withdrawal into Norway, The Finns would offer pursuit
#
in order to make Russia believe that they were pressing the 
Germans, but they would allow the German forces to destroy :
bridges and roads in order to give themselves an excuse for 
never actually catching up with the retreating army. The
6-’Mannerheim? *1-98-499» and Ziemke, 2 9 6,
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Firms, however, warned the Germans that they were determined
to have peace, and they would have to continue to try, in
81-part, to accept. all Soviet demands, ■
On September 28, the Russians told Finland, that they 
were ready 'to "assist" the Finns if they were having trouble 
with the German troops. The threat of Soviet intervention 
produced more hostilities, as the Finns now ordered the 
Germans to hurry their retreat. On October 2, the German 
forces were ordered, to operate "without restraint" against 
the Finns, Now, the Finns were fired upon, hostages were 
taken, and a path of total destruction was laid behind the 
path of retreat, 3y October 8, the German troops had turned 
north at Rovanieni and. were beginning to head toward Norway 
OKil, in early October, began to plan an extension of 
Operation Birke. It was now decided that the Finnish nickel 
was no longer needed. Now, instead of forming defensive 
positions about the nickel fields of northeastern Finland, 
the Twentieth Mountain Army was to withdraw to the so-called'-' 
Lyngen Position, •A short line between the Lyngen Fjord in 
Norway and the northern tip of Sweden, Here, the Germans
hoped to continue to control the northern' Norwegian coast
8 6against any Allied attack.
fUi,‘Ziemke, 297
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'By December, the Nazis controlled only a fen square 
miles of Finnish territory along the northwest border. This 
position was held until the Germans5 surrender in April, 19^5 > 
but, although this small foothold in Finland was retained,
U nGerman influence in Finland had been comule tel;/ ended.w
^Ziemke, 301-3119 pas i
CONCLUSION
The' course of Nazi Germany’s diplomatic history with 
Finland is a classic example of the Reich's political ex­
pedience,. The German people and even .many of...the Nazi 
leaders had a large store of sympathy for Finland’s struggle 
to remain outside the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, but 
this concern for Finland’s plight was subordinated to the 
Reich’s concern for its own welfare,
Finland has unforfunately been branded by some .as a 
willing Nazi ally. This is definitely not the case, Finland, 
because of its geographical location in the Baltic, was 
caught at the apex, of a political triangle which also Included 
the Soviet Union and Germany. Russia had long been a menace 
to the tenuous security of the Finnish people, first, when 
Finland Russia moved west to- fight Sweden five-hundred years 
ago, and then when the Soviet Union tried to use Finland as 
a buffer zone against German aggression in two world wars,
A tiny country of only a-little over three and a half million,
people, Finland has never been able to gain a complete con- /
■; . *
trol over its 'own destiny. It has only been able to survive' 
by allying itself with stronger nations and by bending to 
the’ realities of European politics.
Finland's decision to’side with Germany, in its war’ 
against the Soviet Union was not really a matter of choice.
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It was the only alternative left to the country once it ;hs.d 
been deserted by Sweden and isolated from Great Britain and 
France by Hitler's conquest of Norway in 19^0. Neither the 
Soviet Union nor Germany would have allowed Finland to remain 
out of the war. Russia had long indicated that its troops 
would move Into Finland if a war with Germany began. Hitler 
had included Finland as a possible ally against Russia long 
before he asked the Finns for their support. Finland, then, 
had only three courses of action before it: (1) remain neutral 
and see Its lands turned into a Russo-German battlefield,
(2) ally itself with the Soviet Union and face a future pro­
gram of Russification, or (3) ally itself with Germany and 
try to eliminate the Soviet menace once and for all. Given 
the facts that Finland was Isolated from the Western Allies, 
it.considered Russia as. its mortal enemy, and Germany seemed 
to have an undisputed control over Europe, it Is not difficult 
to understand why Finland chose to collaborate with the Nazis,
Had Finland not bordered on the Soviet Union, it may 
have been able to escape the war by remaining neutral as 
Sweden did. Had it been located on the North Atlantic, it 
would undoubtedly have tried to align itself with the Western 
Allies, The principles of democracy ran deep in Finland, and 
there was little love for or desire to cooperate with the 
Nazis even-aftey it was forced into the war' on. Germany's 
side.
One cannot blame a nation for trying to save Its
independence. During the war years, many nations found them­
selves compromising their principles in order to escape 
totalitarian domination. Great Britain did not relish its 
alliance with the Soviet Union, nor did Hungary wish to join 
the Nazi camp. These were decisions which had to be made 
in order to survive in an era of Realpolitlk.
Hitler used Finland for his own ends. There can be little 
doubt of this. By placing Finland within the Soviet sphere 
of influence in 1939? the Fuehrer was temporarily appeasing 
Russia at Finland’s expense. It was only in 19^0, when 
Hitler’s attention was turned once again to the East, that 
Germany considered friendly relations with Finland,
Germany was Interested in Finland primarily as a second 
front against the Soviet Union. It had been interested in 
the Finnish nickel, - but this was a secondary matter compared 
to the strategic geographic location of Finland. The interest 
In the nickel was Important only because Germany was exper­
iencing wartime shortages; the Reich had no intention of 
conquering the country to control that metal. Hitler also 
did not have any -plan to Include Finland as a part of the 
German Lebensraum. Indeed, he even believed that Finland’s 
swamps and rugged Arctic winters made the country unsuitable 
for the German way of life. The Fuehrer talked vaguely of 
expanding Finland’s borders to the east and the south, but 
this stemmed from a desire to create a strong ally in the 
north rather than from any great love of the Finnish people.
1.6?
Before 19^0, Hitler looked upon Finland as being expendable. 
After 19̂ -0, he looked to Finland only as a means by which he 
could expedite his campaign against the Soviet Union. To the 
Fuehrer, Finland was simply a piece of real estate to be 
bartered or retained, depending on the current needs of the 
Reich.
Finland also tried to use Germany as expediently as 
possible, and it succeeded to a certain extent. Finland's 
war aims were limited and completely contingent upon the. 
Nazis' ability' to win a decisive victory over the Soviet 
union. Finland wanted to cooperate with Germany only in so 
far as that cooperation would be of assistance to itself, . 
This was Illustrated on numerous occasions, much to the dis­
may of the German army. When Hitler's attack into Russia 
began to stall, he began to look for additional assistance 
from Finland, When Leningrad refused to fall,- the Germans 
requested that Finland extend its war aims and continue its 
•offensive to the south. The desired cooperation never mat­
erialized, because Finland realized that Germany had over­
extended itself and it could no longer achieve a decisive 
victory over Russia. When the Germans began their retreat 
from Russia, Finland began an equally proportionate with­
drawal of its support to the Reich.
The Nazi campaign to dominate Europe brought out the 
best and the worst in many nations. Hitler's strategy forced 
many countries to revert to an almost primeval survival of
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the fitest diplomacy. For the nations that shared a common 
border with Russia, the struggle for national existence was 
doubly complicated. These nations found themselves caught 
between two super powers which showed little concern for the 
rights of other countries in their own quest'for expansion 
and national security. The diplomatic maneuvering and then 
the military struggle between Finland, Germany, and the.
Soviet Union was just another chapter in the story of Hitler's 
attempt to conauer Europe.
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